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Abstract 
Generalised anxiety disorder is characterised by excessive, uncontrollable, worry. 
The current study tested the idea that the verbal nature of worry in GAD, due to its abstract 
nature, might self-maintain by generating a widespread attentional bias for threat. It was 
hypothesised that verbal worry would generate more of an attentional bias for threat than 
imagery-based worry which, due to its more concrete nature, was hypothesised to produce 
attentional bias only for stimuli specifically relating to worry content. Verbal worry was 
also hypothesised to give rise to more negative intrusions than imagery-based worry. 
In part one of the study, high-worriers were instructed to worry in either a verbal 
way (the Verbal group) or an imagery-based way (the Imagery group), before completing 
the dot probe task as a measure of attentional bias for threat-related words. In part two, the 
two groups worried in the same way as before and then completed the breathing focus task 
as a measure of the number of negative intrusions occurring after worry. 
The results provided support for the hypothesis that verbal worry produces more 
attentional bias to threat than imagery-based worry but did not support the hypothesis that 
imagery-based worry would produce attentional bias to stimuli specifically relating to 
worry content. The two groups were not found to differ in number of negative intrusions 
following worry. The results are interpreted in terms of verbal worry generating a “general 
threat detection mechanism”, and a new theory of GAD is presented that incorporates this 
speculated mechanism. Clinical implications of the current study‟s findings are discussed 
and consideration is also given to possible future avenues for research. 




1.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the literature regarding worry and its 
characteristics, before exploring three influential theories of worry. The third theory - the 
cognitive avoidance hypothesis – has heavily influenced the current study. This theory 
posits firstly that the function of verbal worry is the avoidance of anxiety-provoking mental 
imagery and secondly that this avoidance might negatively reinforce the worry process, 
allowing it to persist. Evidence for these assertions is summarised, before the properties of 
verbal processing and mental imagery are discussed in terms of how they might impact on 
worry. A new hypothesis is advanced, which proposes that verbal and imagery-based worry 
might engender different sorts of attentional bias. The dot probe methodology used in this 
research to assess attentional bias is summarised, followed by what has been learned to date 
regarding attentional bias for emotional stimuli. Attentional bias in normal, anxious and 
depressed samples is first considered, and finally what is known about the effects of worry 
on attention. The aims of the current study are then laid out, along with a summary of the 
study‟s design and the hypotheses to be tested. 
1.2 Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-
TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) is 
characterised by an excess of anxiety and worry which is perceived as difficult to control 
and is associated with cognitive (e.g., difficulty concentrating) and physiological (e.g., 
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sleep disturbance) symptoms. While the focus of worry must not be purely restricted to the 
concerns inherent in other Axis I disorders in order to meet criteria for diagnosis, 
comorbidity of GAD with other disorders is common; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler and Eaton 
(1994) found 90.4% of people with lifetime GAD to meet diagnostic criteria for at least one 
other lifetime disorder. Comorbidity of GAD with depression appears to be especially 
common (Kessler, Gruber, Hettema, Hwang & Sampson, 2008). The lifetime prevalence of 
GAD in Europe is estimated at 4.3‐5.9% (Tyrer & Baldwin, 2006). 
The primary feature of GAD is worry, to the extent that Andrews et al. (2010) 
proposed that the forthcoming DSM-V re-label it as “generalized worry disorder”. 
1.3 Phenomenology of Worry 
Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky and DePree (1983) defined worry as “...a chain of 
thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” (p. 10). Many 
of these thoughts are “what if” type questions that are generated in the absence of 
threatening stimuli (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur & Freeston, 1998), which are likely to 
bring to mind a multitude of possible negative outcomes. Borkovec et al. proposed that the 
subjective purpose of worry is to problem-solve issues linked with one or more negative 
and uncertain outcomes. 
As for the affective experience of worry, Andrews and Borkovec (1988) 
experimentally induced worry in an unselected college sample and demonstrated a worry 
episode to comprise moderate amounts of anxiety as well as moderate amounts of 
depression, with no unique affective experience not already experienced in anxious and 
depressive states. 
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1.4 Uncontrollability of Worry 
In the study of Borkovec et al. (1983), self-labelled worriers reported significantly 
more uncontrollability of the worry process once it had begun than non-worriers. These 
authors also took an objective measure of this uncontrollability in the form of a task in 
which participants focused on their breathing immediately following a period of worry 
(henceforth referred to as “breathing focus task”). The two groups were compared on the 
number of intrusions experienced during this task, in which their attention moved on to 
other topics and it was found that worriers were more distractible and had more negative 
intrusions than non-worriers. Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) used the same methodology to 
compare participants with GAD and worriers without GAD: They found people with GAD 
to show less control over negative intrusive thoughts on the breathing focus task 
immediately after worrying than worriers without GAD. The former also perceived their 
worry to be less controllable than the latter and, in addition, endorsed more beliefs about 
the disastrous consequences of not keeping worry under control. 
Therefore, the research indicates that people with GAD perceive their worry to be 
less controllable and endorse more negative beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry 
than people without GAD. The research also shows that worries of people with GAD are 
objectively less controllable than those of people without GAD. These findings could be 
explained by one of two hypotheses:  
1. Negative beliefs about worry lead to more objectively uncontrollable worry; and 
2. Due to the objectively uncontrollable nature of worry in GAD, negative beliefs 
develop.  
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Three different models of worry in GAD will now be considered, the first of which 
focuses on the primacy of negative beliefs about uncontrollability of worry in GAD 
(hypothesis one), whereas the other two posit that people with GAD experience objectively 
uncontrollable worry aside from such negative beliefs, which might develop secondary to 
an experience of uncontrollability of worry (hypothesis two). The first model to be 
considered is the meta-cognitive model of Wells (1995). 
1.4.1 Meta-cognitive model. 
According to Wells (1995), worry is driven by meta-beliefs, i.e., beliefs about the 
worry process. Type I worry involves positive beliefs, for instance, regarding the usefulness 
of worry in aiding problem solving, and therefore motivates the individual to worry in 
certain situations, such as when problems arise. What is hypothesised to set people with 
GAD apart from non-clinical worriers is Type II worry, comprising negative beliefs about 
worry, e.g., that it is uncontrollable. These negative beliefs then lead on to unhelpful 
strategies for reducing worry, such as avoidance or thought suppression, which actually 
serve to increase the intrusiveness of worry, i.e., increase its uncontrollability. Now the 
intolerance of uncertainty model of GAD will be considered (Dugas et al., 1998), which 
provides an account of how worry in GAD might entail some inherent, objective 
uncontrollability (hypothesis two). 
1.4.2 Intolerance of uncertainty. 
According to Borkovec et al.‟s (1983) definition of worry, events with uncertain 
outcomes are the focus of the worry process. Dugas et al. (1998) outlined a model of GAD 
which places intolerance of uncertainty at centre stage in the disorder, which is defined by 
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Dugas, Buhr and Ladouceur (2004) as an individual‟s predisposition to reacting in a 
negative way (cognitively, emotionally and behaviourally) to uncertain situations. 
According to the model of Dugas et al. (1998), people who have a higher intolerance of 
uncertainty react to uncertain situations by asking “what if?” questions, which leads them to 
consider many possible negative outcomes, leading on to worry and anxiety. The basic 
assumptions of this model have been empirically supported. For instance, Ladouceur, 
Gosselin and Dugas (2000) induced varying levels of intolerance of uncertainty using a 
gambling procedure, and found evidence for a higher level of worry in those in whom 
intolerance of uncertainty was experimentally elevated than those in whom it was reduced. 
According to this model, objective uncontrollability of worry in GAD might arise from the 
short-term effectiveness of the worry process in dealing with intolerance of uncertainty and 
its associated anxiety in the short term, making it a highly reinforced behaviour which 
might become increasingly automatic over time. Now we shall consider the model of GAD 
that has most influenced the current study, which provides another account of how worry 
might entail some objective uncontrollability (hypothesis two). 
1.5 Cognitive Avoidance Hypothesis 
Similarly to the model of Dugas et al. (1998), the cognitive avoidance hypothesis 
(Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004) can provide an account for how worry might be 
objectively uncontrollable in GAD due to its short-term anxiety-reducing properties. This 
model was devised to account for the relative dominance of verbal processing in the 
phenomenology of worry (Borkovec & Inz, 1990), which cannot be easily explained by 
either the model of Wells (1995) or Dugas et al. (1998). Borkovec and Inz found non-
anxious controls to report predominantly mental images when relaxed, which shifted to 
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including mostly thought when worrying, which the authors described as “abstract, 
conceptual thinking activity” (p. 153). People with GAD, on the other hand, reported a 
balance of imagery and thought when relaxed, with a non-significant increase in thought 
content and decrease in imagery content during worry. East and Watts (1994) found a 
significant increase in thoughts and a decrease in images among high trait worriers moving 
from relaxation to worry. When images do occur in the worry process, they tend to be 
fleeting and are quickly replaced by verbal thought activity (Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006). 
Based on these findings, the cognitive avoidance hypothesis (Borkovec et al., 2004) 
holds as its central premise that the verbal worry process serves not only as a perceived 
problem-solving tool for avoiding or mitigating the aversive scenario itself but also as a 
means of avoiding the somatic symptoms of anxiety elicited by mental imagery associated 
with this feared scenario. Borkovec (1994) evoked Mowrer‟s (1947) two-factor learning 
theory in which anxiety-provoking imagery is comparable to a phobic stimulus that is 
avoided by engaging in worry because worry dampens somatic anxiety in the short-term. 
This anxiety-dampening effect of worry will be negatively reinforced, rendering it an 
increasingly automatic strategy, accounting for how worry might become objectively 
uncontrollable in GAD. Borkovec also drew on the theory of Foa and Kozak (1986) to 
propose that, in the longer-term, the avoidance of mental imagery will prevent full 
habituation from occurring, which requires repeated exposure to aversive stimuli and the 
activation of entire “fear structures” stored in memory, which includes imagery as well as 
affective components. If verbal worry precludes the prolonged and full activation of 
imagery as well as affective processing, it would preclude habituation and maintain anxiety 
to the stimulus in question. Borkovec also noted that, while worrying might help the 
individual to avoid imagery, it might also prime images such that they are more easily 
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retrieved. This provides an additional route to worry being objectively uncontrollable, as 
images that are primed could come to mind in a way that is intrusive, triggering another 
highly reinforced worry episode. 
There is empirical support for the conceptualisation of worry as avoidance of 
anxiety-provoking imagery. Borkovec and Hu (1990) demonstrated that worrying before 
looking at phobic images relating to giving a speech lowered cardiovascular response to the 
images, relative to being in a neutral state preceding image presentation. Worry can also 
function to suppress affect after the presentation of aversive stimuli: Butler, Wells and 
Dewick (1995) found that instructing participants to worry about an anxiety-provoking 
video in a verbal way after viewing it led to a greater decrement in anxiety than those who 
generated mental images from the video. As support for the idea that verbal worry 
maintains itself, these authors also found that participants instructed to worry in a verbal 
way reported more frequent intrusions relating to the video they had seen in the days that 
followed, compared with those who generated images about the video. In a similar vein, a 
recent study by Stokes and Hirsch (2010) found that engaging in negative verbal processing 
of real-life worry topics (i.e., typical verbal worry) in high worriers increased the number of 
negative intrusions on a breathing focus task, in keeping with studies discussed previously, 
whereas engaging in negative imagery-based processing of real-life worry topics decreased 
the number of negative intrusions. Now let us consider the properties of verbal processing 
that might make it unhelpful in the maintenance of worry. 
1.6 What Is Unhelpful about Verbal Processing? 
The cognitive avoidance hypothesis asserts that it is the inherently abstract nature of 
verbal worry that is important. By being more abstract, it elicits a lesser somatic anxiety 
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response than imagery, which is a more concrete representation of the feared scenario. An 
experiment by Vrana, Cuthbert and Lang (1986) supports this assertion, which showed that 
verbal articulation of fear material elicits little cardiovascular response, whereas more 
concrete imagination of a scene that represents the same fear evokes considerable 
cardiovascular response.  
Stöber‟s (1998) reduced-concreteness theory of worry proposes that it is the fact 
that verbal worry is not a concrete process that leads it to reduce the amount of imagery. 
Stöber, (1997) found worry in a nonclinical sample to become less concrete as participants 
worried more about the problem in question. The reduced-concreteness theory draws on 
dual coding theory (Paivio, 1971, 1986), in which the quality of imagery is determined in 
part by the concreteness of words and sentences, due to the integrated nature of verbal and 
imagery-based processes. For instance, Paivio and Marschark (1991) showed abstract 
sentences to generate images that were less vivid than concrete sentences, and the images 
were also generated more slowly and with less ease. Now let us consider what might be the 
utility of imagery-based processing. 
1.7 What Is the Utility of Imagery-Based Processing? 
Kosslyn, Behrmann and Jeannerod (1995) considered imagery to be “„seeing‟ in the 
absence of the appropriate immediate sensory input” and provided evidence for this by 
demonstrating primary visual cortical activation to be implicated in both visual perception 
and visual imagery; furthermore, the bigger the size of the imagined object, the greater the 
activation of the primary visual cortex. 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  19 
 
The overlap between visual perception and mental imagery forms an important 
basis of Holmes and Mathews‟ (2010) model of the impact of verbal/imagery 
representations on emotions. According to this model, mental imagery can arise via a 
bottom-up route in which sensory cues that match representations in episodic and semantic 
memory can cause those memories to be automatically and involuntarily retrieved as 
images. Mental imagery can also result from a top-down process in which images are 
volitionally constructed. As imagery involves the activation of brain systems involved in 
processing perceived events, it directly accesses emotional systems. The degree of 
emotional activation depends on the type of image, and a field perspective (as though 
looking at the imagined scene through one‟s own eyes) elicits more emotion than an 
observer perspective (as though seeing the scene from the position of a third person), as 
indicated in the research (e.g., Holmes, Coughtrey & Connor, 2008). According to the 
model of Holmes and Mathews, as verbal processing involves less overlap with perceived 
events, when it is retrieved from autobiographical and semantic memory stores (either via a 
top-down or a bottom-up process) it does not elicit as much emotion. 
When participants are trained to deliberately imagine their worries, as in the current 
study, it could be said that the top-down route is activated, allowing for imaginal exposure 
(Foa, Steketee, Turner & Fischer, 1980) to “fear structures” (Foa & Kozak, 1986) and a 
consequent reduction in associated anxiety; according to the cognitive avoidance 
hypothesis (Borkovec et al., 2004) this would lead to a reduction of worry. Holmes and 
Mathews (2010) speculated on some additional ways in which generating mental imagery 
might be beneficial. For one, exposure to imagery might help impress on the individual the 
realisation that images are merely representations of the world and not the world itself. 
Holmes and Mathews also discussed the possibility of rescripting (e.g., Butler & Holmes, 
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2009) in which participants are instructed to transform their negative image into something 
more neutral, which might have a positive emotional impact. 
1.8 Summary of the Cognitive Avoidance Hypothesis 
The cognitive avoidance hypothesis asserts that a key function of verbal worry in 
the short-term is to suppress anxiety-provoking mental imagery. The effectiveness of this 
strategy might partly account for the objective uncontrollability of worry in GAD, as verbal 
worry will become highly negatively reinforced and, as a result, a relatively automatic 
strategy for reducing anxiety. However, in the longer-term, such avoidance of anxiety-
provoking mental imagery will interfere with the habituation of the mental imagery that is 
being suppressed and its associated affect, which will serve to increase the individual‟s 
reliance on the verbal worry process in suppressing imagery.  
Evidence supporting the premises of the cognitive avoidance hypothesis has been 
discussed. The unhelpful non-concrete nature of verbal worry has been discussed, as well 
as some reasons why imagery-based processing might be helpful in reducing worry. 
The current study is concerned with a complementary hypothesis as to how verbal 
processing might perpetuate the worry process. As mentioned previously, Stokes and 
Hirsch (2010) found verbal worry to give rise to a higher number of negative thought 
intrusions on the breathing focus task than imagery-based worry. One interpretation for this 
is that verbal worry, once initiated as a means of avoiding mental imagery, might generate 
an attentional bias for negative stimuli, leading to more negative thought intrusions that 
interfere with the core task of focusing on one‟s breathing. The potential role that attention 
has to play in maintaining worry will now be considered in more detail. 
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1.9 The Role of Attention 
According to the combined cognitive bias hypothesis of Hirsch, Clark and Mathews 
(2006), the presence of a bias in one cognitive process can generate a bias in the same 
direction in other cognitive processes. The study of Hertel, Mathews, Peterson and Kintner 
(2003) is supportive of this idea: Participants in whom an interpretation bias was generated 
(either toward threat-related or neutral stimuli) went on to generate mental images in a later 
task that were congruent with the trained interpretation bias (i.e., either threat-related or 
neutral in valence). This study indicated, therefore, that a bias in the cognitive process of 
interpretation can generate a similar bias in the process of generating mental imagery. 
Hirsch and Mathews (submitted) have proposed a new cognitive theory of worry in 
GAD, which incorporates the notion of cognitive biases transferring from one cognitive 
process to another: The theory proposes that the abstract (non-specific) nature of verbal 
worry generates a non-specific attentional bias, which serves as a “general threat detection 
mechanism”. For example, if a person with GAD worries about illness in verbal form, the 
abstract nature of this process would involve the generation of hypothetical scenarios 
characterised by “what if” questions (Dugas et al., 1998), in which the person might start 
off worrying about feeling ill but might also begin to worry about things that are vaguely 
related, such as the number of sick days they have left. This generation of multiple possible 
negative outcomes could lead to a catastrophising process in which they might worry about 
losing their job, their income, and their house. As a result, the worry process would 
encompass diverse themes. Verbal worry is also abstract as it is likely to include threat 
words that are vague and non-specific, such as “awful” and “disaster”, which might also 
trigger a non-specific attentional bias for all sorts of threatening scenarios. If an attentional 
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bias for a wide range of potential threat operates, then this is hypothesised to lead to more 
negative thought intrusions (as found in Stokes & Hirsch, 2010), and perseveration of 
worry.  
In the same example of a person with GAD worrying about illness, a more concrete 
processing style, such as imagery-based worry, might involve generating a detailed image 
of being at home in bed, with limited movement from one worry topic to another. This sort 
of concrete processing style is hypothesised to lead to a more specific attentional bias only 
for those stimuli that are related to the worry topic. If the theory of Hirsch and Mathews 
(submitted) were valid, we would expect attentional bias to be less widespread after worry 
in imagery-based form and there should also be fewer intrusions. 
Attention is a particularly relevant candidate for us to consider in relation to worry 
due to the wealth of research that has linked anxiety and depression with attentional biases 
for emotional stimuli. We shall now consider the paradigm that is used in the current study 
to measure attentional bias for emotional stimuli. 
1.10 The Dot Probe Task 
Cisler, Bacon and Williams (2009) reviewed the literature on attentional biases for 
threat and concluded that “Attention towards threat has probably most extensively been 
studied using the dot probe paradigm.” This task was developed by MacLeod, Mathews and 
Tata (1986) by adapting a cognitive psychological paradigm that analysed the 
characteristics of visual attention indirectly through the measurement of manual reaction 
times (henceforth: RTs) to visual stimuli (e.g., Posner, Snyder and Davidson, 1980; Navon 
and Margalit, 1983). The research using this paradigm had already indicated that 
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participants are faster to respond to visual stimuli when they appear in an attended location. 
MacLeod et al. presented participants with a number of trials each beginning with a pair of 
words presented on a computer screen, one on top of the other, for 500 ms before 
disappearing (this is known as the stimulus onset asynchrony, or “SOA” - the duration of 
cue presentation prior to the appearance of the probe stimulus). On only some trials, a pair 
was replaced by a dot in the position of one of the former words, whereas on most trials 
there was no dot (“filler” trials). A pair of words could either comprise two neutral words 
or one threat related and one neutral word (which comprised a “critical” trial when the 
Threat-Neutral word pairs were followed by a probe). Participants were instructed to press 
a button as quickly as possibly when they saw a probe (a black dot). On the dot probe task, 
an Attentional Bias Index is calculated for each participant by subtracting the mean RT to 
dots replacing threat stimuli from the mean RT to dots replacing neutral stimuli on a critical 
trial. A positive index score indicates a relatively faster RT to threat, i.e., an attentional bias 
for threat. MacLeod et al. found a positive index score in their group of participants with 
GAD, whereas this was not found in the control group. These results were taken to show 
that people with GAD show an attentional bias for threat-related stimuli and it was also 
reasoned that this likely reflects the anxious individual‟s tendency to favour the processing 
of threatening versus non-threatening information encountered in daily life. 
Since the study of MacLeod et al. (1986), the dot probe task has been used in 
various forms. Salemink, van den Hout and Kindt (2007) have termed the original version 
the “detection” task. In this version, participants are required to press a button to indicate 
when they have detected a probe, as was the case in the study of MacLeod et al. Mogg and 
Bradley (1999) noted two major limitations to this early version of the dot probe task, the 
first being that it requires “filler” trials in which no probe appears, which places a higher 
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load on participants‟ sustained attention, and that this is likely to be impaired in 
emotionally disordered individuals. The second shortcoming that Mogg and Bradley 
discussed is that, as threatening words are more likely to appear on trials in which a probe 
appears, participants might use this covariation as a “warning cue” for the appearance of a 
probe and base their responses on this rather than waiting to see a probe appear. Mogg and 
Bradley therefore developed a new variant of the dot probe task to overcome these 
drawbacks, which they termed the “probe position” task. In this task, “filler” trials are not 
required as participants indicate on each trial, by pressing one of two buttons, where the 
probe appears (e.g., in the location of the top or the bottom word) as opposed to whether or 
not a probe appears. Nonetheless, these authors acknowledged a theoretical problem with 
this task, as participants could adopt a strategy of attending to only one location and base 
their response on whether or not the probe appears in that location. These authors proposed 
that the “probe classification” task of MacLeod and Chong (1998), in which participants‟ 
responses indicate the type of probe that is seen on every trial (whether a horizontal pair of 
dots [:] or a vertical pair [..]), rather than its location, overcomes the shortcomings of their 
“probe classification” task as well as those of the “detection” task. 
Salemink et al. (2007) compared the “probe classification” task with the “probe 
detection” task in effectiveness at revealing a correlation between attentional bias and 
anxiety in a non-clinical sample. The “probe detection” task was found to be superior in 
this regard, detecting attentional bias where the “probe classification” task did not. 
Nonetheless, the authors acknowledged that dot probe tasks are known to be inconsistent 
and a fragile indication of anxiety-related attentional bias in non-clinical samples, as had 
also been concluded by Mogg et al. (2000). Hence, until this result is replicated, it should 
be interpreted with caution. Now we shall consider in more detail what the dot probe task, 
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as well as other attentional paradigms, have taught us with regard to attentional bias for 
emotional stimuli across normal, anxious and depressed samples. 
1.11 Attentional Bias for Threat 
1.11.1 Sample characteristics. 
The original findings of MacLeod et al. (1986) have been well replicated using the 
dot probe task, showing a significantly stronger bias for threatening words in clinical 
groups than in non-clinical controls (e.g., GAD: Mogg, Mathews & Eysenck, 1992 and 
Mogg, Bradley & Williams, 1995; panic disorder and social anxiety: Hornstein & Segui, 
1997; post-traumatic stress disorder: Bryant & Harvey, 1997). Attentional bias for threat 
has also been found to operate in depression (Bradley et al., 1997). 
Schmukle (2005) noted that attentional bias has been found less consistently in non-
clinical “high trait anxiety” than in clinical anxiety. For instance, Schmukle noted that, 
although the study of Broadbent and Broadbent (1988) found a relationship between 
anxiety and attentional bias in which only high trait anxious individuals showed attentional 
bias for threat, this was not replicated in two subsequent studies (Mogg, Bradley, de Bono 
and Painter, 1997; Mogg et al., 2000). Schmukle accounted for this inconsistency by 
conducting a study which showed the dot probe task to have low internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability in an unselected sample and argued that this meant the dot probe is not 
appropriate for investigating inter-individual differences within a given sample, e.g., a non-
clinical group. However, Schmukle noted that these results do not apply to studies that 
compare the effects of different experimental treatments, as is the case in the current study. 
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There is some evidence that attentional bias can differ according to the type of 
anxiety. Social anxiety is one type that has been shown to engender a bias in attention away 
from emotional facial stimuli (e.g., Mansell, Clark, Ehlers & Chen, 1999). In some cases, 
this attentional avoidance of faces has been demonstrated regardless of the valence of the 
face (e.g., Chen, Ehlers, Clark & Mansell, 2002). However, this is not a consistent finding 
as there are many studies which have found no such effect in social anxiety, whether using 
faces (e.g., Sposari and Rapee, 2007) or words (e.g., Mansell, Ehlers, Clark & Chen, 2002). 
1.11.2 Stimulus characteristics. 
The types of stimuli that can elicit attentional bias have contributed to our 
understanding of the phenomenon. Bradley, Mogg, Falla and Hamilton (1998) found high 
trait anxious participants to show an attentional bias for threatening faces and away from 
happy faces. In a similar vein, some researchers have opted to use more biologically 
relevant stimuli (see Seligman‟s [1971] theory of “preparedness” in anxiety). For instance, 
Yiend (2010) concluded from the research that the use of biological stimuli in the dot probe 
task (such as pictures of snakes or spiders) is one condition under which attentional biases 
are found in the general population.  
Bradley et al. (1997) argued that pictorial stimuli are more naturalistic than the 
single word stimuli traditionally used in attentional bias research. Furthermore, they noted 
that familiarity and frequency effects might confound research findings, in which, for 
instance, the frequency with which anxious participants use certain words might prime 
these words in such participants, leading to biased RTs as a result of this rather than the 
effects of attentional bias for threat. On the other hand, Mogg and Bradley (1999) made the 
case for the use of word stimuli in some cases, in that words “can reflect a wide range of 
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anxiety-related cues which enhances their usefulness in studies of the content-specificity of 
processing biases in different anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder and generalised 
anxiety disorder.” 
Some studies have categorised pictorial stimuli at different levels of threat value to 
test the effects of stimulus intensity on attentional bias for threat. For instance, Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere and DeHouwer (2004) showed high- and low-trait anxious 
participants pictures of varying threat intensities and found both groups to have an 
attentional bias for highly threatening pictures, whereas the high trait anxious group 
demonstrated a stronger attentional bias for moderately threatening pictures than the low-
trait anxious group. This is consistent with the “cognitive motivational” theory of Mogg 
and Bradley (1998), in which higher anxiety engenders higher reactivity to threat such that 
the same stimulus will be reacted to as if of a higher threat value in more highly anxious 
individuals than in less anxious individuals. 
Another determinant of reactivity to threat stimuli is the degree of relevance of 
threatening stimuli to the individual‟s concerns. Mogg et al. (1992) employed the dot probe 
task to investigate the specificity of attentional bias for stimuli related to participants‟ 
predominant domains of concern (henceforth referred to as “domain-specific” attentional 
bias). The authors asked participants whether they were more frequently concerned about 
social worries or physical worries, as well as the degree to which they were concerned 
about each type of domain. A significant correlation was found between attentional bias for 
social threat words and participants‟ degree of concern about social threat, but not with 
degree of concern about physical threat. A non-significant positive correlation was found 
between attentional bias for physical threat words and participants‟ degree of concern about 
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physical threat, but not with degree of concern about social threat. The findings of this 
study were in contrast to those of MacLeod et al.‟s (1986) seminal study, in which no 
evidence was found of specific attentional bias for social or physical threat words aligning 
with participants‟ domains of concern on the dot probe task. Mogg et al. argued that the 
study of MacLeod et al. did not categorise participants into domains of predominant 
concern in a way that would be sufficiently sensitive to the specificity of attentional bias, as 
participants were merely categorised as being predominantly concerned by either physical 
or social threats by use of a single forced-choice question, with no quantitative ratings of 
the degree to which they worried about both domains. 
Domain-specific attentional bias has been demonstrated more consistently in studies 
that have used the modified Stroop colour-naming task, in which participants are presented 
with lists of words of the same category on the same sheet and go through each word 
sequentially, reporting the colour in which each word is printed as quickly as possible 
rather than reading aloud the word itself (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, 
Mathews & Weinman, 1989; McNally et al., 1994; Mattia, Heimberg & Hope, 1993). An 
interference effect was found in these studies, in which participants were significantly 
slower to read aloud the colours of words relating to their specific concerns than words not 
relating to their specific concerns, which is traditionally interpreted as due to the effect of 
biased attention toward the word contents competing with attentional resources required to 
name the colour in which the words are printed. Mogg et al. suggested this could be due to 
anxiety involving an initial general bias for all sorts of threatening stimuli at an early stage 
of processing, which is not available to conscious awareness, followed by an elaboration of 
the domain-relevant stimuli at a later stage of processing, which enters conscious 
awareness. The authors argued that this later, elaborative process is more likely to occur on 
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the modified Stroop task as stimuli are repeatedly presented in a block all together, 
remaining available for longer; on the dot probe task stimuli are presented much more 
briefly and might not reach this later stage in the information-processing sequence. When 
Mogg, Brendan, Bradley, Williams, Mathews (1993) conducted the original Stroop task in 
which stimuli were presented sequentially but in isolation, there was no such domain-
specific interference effect. Following this result, the authors additionally proposed that the 
blocked nature of words of a similar semantic content on the modified Stroop task might 
allow for the requisite elaborate processing of a theme, which might allow domain-specific 
attentional bias to emerge. 
Another stimulus characteristic that has been modified in the dot probe task is the 
SOA. Since the study of MacLeod et al. (1986), the dot probe task has included SOAs 
longer and shorter than 500 ms in order to explore the operation of attentional biases at 
different stages of processing. In her review of the literature on attentional bias for 
emotional stimuli, Yiend (2010) noted that “normal” samples seem to show attentional bias 
for threat only at certain SOAs on the dot probe task but that this is not the case in highly 
anxious samples. For example, Cooper and Langton (2006) tested an unselected student 
sample on a modified dot probe task and demonstrated an attentional avoidance of happy 
faces with no significant bias for angry faces at an SOA of 100 ms; however, at 500 ms, 
this pattern had more or less reversed, with significant avoidance of angry faces and a trend 
toward attentional bias for happy faces. Conversely, attentional bias for threat in highly 
anxious samples has been shown to occur at SOAs ranging from 14 ms (Bradley, Mogg & 
Lee, 1997 – cues presented at this SOA were also masked) to 1500ms (e.g., Bradley et al., 
1998). On the other hand, attentional bias in depression is only found when more time is 
given for stimulus processing, e.g., Bradley et al. (1997), who found an attentional bias for 
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negative words during induced/natural sad mood at SOAs of 500 and 1000 ms, which 
disappeared at shorter SOAs and when stimuli were masked. These findings have 
implications for the stages of processing at which attentional bias can operate, which will 
now be discussed. 
1.12 Automatic and Strategic Processing 
Moors and De Houwer (2006) summarised the concept of automatic processing in 
cognitive psychology as involving processing that is “unintentional, 
uncontrolled/uncontrollable, goal independent, autonomous, purely stimulus driven, 
unconscious, efficient, and fast”. Strategic processing could be taken to mean essentially 
the opposite, bearing in mind that research indicates automatic and strategic processing to 
merely represent two extremes of a continuum (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975). Yiend (2010) 
noted that these different aspects of automaticity are not always present together and that 
“awareness” is the characteristic that has been most frequently investigated, which can be 
varied by presenting stimuli either subliminally (e.g., at stimulus durations < 14 ms and/or 
masked) or supraliminally (at longer durations without masking). Yiend also noted that 
automaticity is related to the “preattentive” processing stage in Treisman and Gelade‟s 
(1980) feature integration theory, in which basic perceptual properties of visual stimuli, 
such as colour, are processed in parallel. Following the “preattentive” stage, a serial process 
takes place in which attention binds these individual properties together such that stimuli 
are perceived in their combined features. 
The two-stage theory of Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1988, 1997) 
gives a detailed cognitive account of the different attentional bias in anxiety and depression. 
This theory proposes a time-course of attention, in which priming occurs first along the 
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chronology of processing, and elaboration happens later. These two processes can be said 
to relate to the automatic/preattentive and strategic continuum. According to this theory, 
two crucial mechanisms operate at both priming and elaborative stages: An affective 
decision mechanism (ADM) and a resource allocation mechanism (RAM). The stimulus 
input is processed by the ADM in the priming/preattentive stage, increasing its output at 
this point in proportion to its threat value (the individual‟s state anxiety also increases 
output at the ADM). Once a particular threshold of activity is reached, the ADM's output 
goes to the RAM of the priming/preattentive stage, where an individual with high trait 
anxiety will direct their attention towards threat at this stage, whereas low trait anxious 
individuals will attentionally avoid the stimulus. The output from the priming/preattentive 
stage is passed on to the elaborative stage, in which the same sequence of events occurs, 
except that state depression increases output at the elaborative ADM, and trait depression 
determines whether the stimulus is given greater or reduced elaborative processing at the 
elaborative RAM. 
Mogg et al. (1993) noted that the theory of Williams et al. (1998, 1997) does not 
explain the observation in their study that attentional bias for threat is absent in depressed 
samples who also have high anxiety. The Mathews and Mackintosh model (1998) might 
provide a better account for this observation. In their model, attention to threat cues in 
anxiety depends on the interaction of two opposing tendencies: Bottom-up activation of 
threat representation by a threat evaluation system (TES – similar to the ADM of the two-
stage theory of Williams et al.) and top-down activation of competing representations 
related to non-threat-related goals by effortful task demand (ETD). Representations of 
threatening stimuli in the TES are stimulated by sensation of the stimuli themselves, and 
the TES in turn sends back activation to threatening representations, increasing attention to 
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them. The TES will only send activation to threatening representations when it's 
sufficiently activated, and its activation increases with increasing state anxiety and 
subjective severity of the threat stimulus (proposed to be higher in high trait anxious 
individuals). Any attentional biases result from an interaction between the TES and ETD 
and, as the ETD is a limited-capacity system and the TES is not, a point is always reached 
at which the TES will prevail and attention will shift to the threatening/distracter stimulus. 
Depression could be argued to entail top-down inhibition of threat representations, leading 
to the overriding of anxiety-linked attentional bias when there is comorbid depression.  
The cognitive motivational view of Mogg and Bradley (1998) mentioned previously 
argues that the different results regarding attentional bias in anxiety and depression can be 
explained in terms of the reference axes of “valence” and “engagement”; whereas anxiety 
involves negative affect and external goal engagement, depression involves negative affect 
and disengagement from external goals. According to this model, comorbid depression 
impairs the external goal engagement in anxiety with its disengagement mechanism, giving 
rise to no preattentive bias for threat when there is comorbid anxiety and depression. 
However, the Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) and Mogg and Bradley models do not 
explain the fact that depression does show an attentional bias at stimulus presentations of 
longer than 500ms (Bradley et al., 1997), whereas the previously discussed model of 
Williams et al. (1988, 1997) does provide an account for this. 
The “vigilance avoidance hypothesis” (Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004) is a 
subsidiary element of the Mogg and Bradley (1998) model, which posits that there will 
always be an automatic attentional bias away from threat at lower levels of threat intensity 
but that this gives way to an automatic attentional bias for threat as the intensity of threat 
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increases. Those high in trait anxiety have a lower threshold of objective threat level 
required to trigger automatic attentional bias for threat. Furthermore, the automatic 
attentional bias for threat is followed by a strategic attentional avoidance of threat at longer 
SOAs, in order to reduce anxiety. Mogg et al. provided evidence in support for this by 
showing high trait anxious individuals to show an attentional bias for threat at an SOA of 
500 ms but no attentional bias for threat at 1500 ms, on the dot probe task. In those high 
trait anxious participants with a fear of blood-injury, there was significant avoidance that 
set in at the longer SOA. Mogg and Bradley (2006) found a significant attentional bias for 
spider stimuli on the dot probe task only at a shorter SOA (200 ms) and not at longer SOAs 
(500 and 2000 ms), in a spider-phobic sample. 
Cisler and Koster (2010) made an important qualification to be borne in mind when 
discussing automatic and strategic processing: That the boundary between the two is not 
well defined. These authors cited Pessoa (2008), who had argued against keeping apart the 
emotional and cognitive systems of the brain (these could be said to map on to automatic 
and strategic processes, respectively), as these systems are interactive. For instance, Pessoa 
(2005) demonstrated that automatic amygdala activation toward threat depends on 
availability of strategic attentional resources, a strategic process. Now that we have 
considered stimulus and participant characteristics under which attentional bias takes place, 
as well as the stages of processing at which attentional bias is apparent, let us look at the 
different components of attention that research has unveiled and the roles they play in 
attentional bias for emotional stimuli. 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  34 
 
1.13 The Components of Attention 
Posner (1980) pioneered an experimental paradigm in which the separate 
components of visual attention could be explored. Participants sat in front of a computer 
monitor and fixated a central stimulus while a simple peripheral cue appeared either to the 
left or to the right of fixation. After a very brief period the cue would disappear and a 
stimulus appeared either at the same location (known as a valid trial) or at the opposite 
location (known as an invalid trial) as the preceding cue, to which the participant 
responded. Participants maintained their focus on the fixation cross throughout the 
experiment and were instructed not to move their attention to cues or the stimuli that 
followed them.  
Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich and Cohen (1987) hypothesised the operation of three 
component subroutines to the visual attentional process: “Engage” to a location, 
“disengage” from that location and “move” to another location. These components and 
their independent neural bases were empirically supported by neuropsychological research; 
for example, Posner, Walker, Friedrich and Rafal (1984) demonstrated that damage to the 
parietal lobe uniquely impairs RTs on invalid trials, which was taken to indicate that this 
brain region mediates the operation in which people disengage their attention from an 
attended stimulus. 
In order to explore components of attention as they might relate to emotional 
material, Yiend and Mathews (2001) modified the original Posner task such that the cue on 
each trial was either a neutral or a threatening picture, and used a selected population 
consisting of participants with high trait anxiety and those with low trait anxiety. These 
authors found that attentional bias for emotionally threatening pictures in high trait anxious 
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individuals impairs the disengage component of the attentional sequence and that the 
engage component is not affected. 
Fox, Russo, Bowles and Dutton (2001) noted a limitation to all prior versions of the 
dot probe in that results from the dot probe task could only detect that an attentional bias 
was operating but that the data could not identify the components of attention that were 
affected. The “Attentional Bias Index” discussed previously in relation to the dot probe task 
can indicate whether there is an attentional bias for threat but it can only tell us whether 
there is a speeding of RTs on trials when a probe replaces a threatening stimulus relative to 
trials when a probe replaces a neutral stimulus; it does not tell us whether this is due to 
faster responses to dots replacing threat stimuli (reflecting the engage function) or slower 
responses to dots replacing neutral stimuli (reflecting the disengage function). 
More recently, the dot probe task has been modified to allow for a more fine-tuned 
analysis of the components of attention that are affected by anxiety. Koster et al. (2004) 
adapted the dot probe task to allow for a decomposition of engage and disengage 
components of attention. This was achieved by adding Neutral-Neutral trials that are 
always probed, just like Threat-Neutral trials, i.e., trials in which there is not a threat word 
but both words are neutral in valence. This provided a baseline measure of RTs to visual 
stimuli. By comparing the baseline RTs to probes replacing threat words on Threat-Neutral 
trials or probes replacing neutral words on Threat-Neutral trials, the dot probe allowed for 
the engage and disengage components of attention to be investigated. Salemink et al. 
(2007) first used the adaptation of Koster et al. in order to assess the engage and disengage 
components of attention in different anxiety groups and, similarly to Yiend and Mathews 
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(2001), found high trait anxiety to delay disengagement from threat-related words but not to 
enhance attentional engagement to these words. 
1.14 Attentional Bias in Worry 
Very little is known as yet about attentional bias relating specifically to worry. Only 
one study (Oathes, Squillante, Ray & Nitschke, 2010) has used the dot probe to look at 
attentional bias in worry to date, in which a group of low worriers performed the dot probe 
task after two separate conditions: One in which they worried and the other in which they 
performed a distractor task. The authors found no significant Condition x Threat Position x 
Probe Position interaction on an ANOVA, indicating the absence of an attentional bias for 
threat following worry. An additional analysis by Oathes et al. showed worry to speed RTs 
to the attended location (as participants in their version of the dot probe task were 
instructed to read the top word aloud) more so on Threat-Neutral trials than Neutral-Neutral 
trials, as indicated by a Condition x Trial Type x Probe Position interaction, which was 
interpreted in favour of worry generating more “vigilance” in the presence of threat. 
Another recent study by Hirsch et al. (2011) looked at the effects of training attentional bias 
for threat meanings on worry in a normal sample. They found that training participants to 
engage their attention to threat meanings gave rise to more negative intrusions on the 
breathing focus task than training that achieved the opposite, whereas training that impaired 
disengagement from threat meanings did not give rise to more negative intrusions on the 
breathing focus task than training that achieved the opposite. 
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1.15 The Current Study: The Impact of Engaging in Verbal versus Imagery-Based 
Worry on Attentional Processing 
1.15.1 Two different methods of measuring attentional bias for threat. 
The current study employs two different experimental tasks in order to investigate 
the effect of different forms of worry on attentional bias for threat, i.e., allocation of 
attentional resources toward threatening stimuli. The first is the dot probe task. If 
attentional bias for threat is operating, it will influence responding on the dot probe task, as 
probes replacing threatening words will receive quicker responses due to attention having 
been allocated to threatening stimuli. As stimuli are presented for 200 ms, any attentional 
bias for threat will be operating at a relatively automatic stage of processing. 
A similar mechanism is proposed to produce more negative intrusions on the 
breathing focus task. Attentional bias for threat will direct attention away from the neutral 
stimulus of one‟s breath and toward negative stimuli, such as sensations of physical fatigue 
or cognitions that are negative in valence. Unlike the dot probe task, the breathing focus 
task is not proposed to represent any specific point of the automatic-strategic continuum of 
attentional bias. An additional mechanism that might bias responding on the breathing 
focus task is interpretation  bias; for example, a negative interpretation bias might make one 
more likely to interpret the sensations of physical fatigue as negative (e.g., as being due to 
illness) rather than neutral (e.g., as resulting from hunger). 
1.15.2 Aims. 
The current study concerns itself with the effects of worrying on attentional bias. It 
was reasoned that abstract and non-specific verbal worry might engender a non-specific 
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attentional bias for threat by activating a general, non-specific threat system, and that this 
would manifest as facilitated engagement to a wide range of threat-related stimuli and/or as 
impaired disengagement from these stimuli, on the dot probe task. In contrast, it was 
reasoned that more concrete and specific imagery-based worry might engender a more 
specific attentional bias only to threat words on the dot probe task that are highly related to 
worry content. If an attentional bias for a wide range of potential threats were in operation, 
then we would also expect this to lead to more automatic negative thought intrusions on the 
breathing focus task. 
As worry is known to be dimensional as opposed to categorical and continuously 
distributed among the population in terms of severity (e.g., Ruscio, Borkovec & Ruscio, 
2001), Hayes and Hirsch (2007) noted that studies on people without GAD can be helpful 
for investigating worry. 
1.15.3 Overview of design. 
The present study recruited high worriers (scores > 55 on the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire [PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990]) who were not required 
to meet criteria for GAD. Participants were randomly allocated to either a Verbal or an 
Imagery group and each participant was trained to worry in a verbal way or an imagery-
based way, depending on group allocation. In the first part of the study, participants 
worried for a 6 minute period in their designated style before completing the dot probe task, 
with another 2 minute worry period placed in the middle of the dot probe task to re-activate 
worry. In the second half of the study, participants worried for another 6 minute period 
about a different worry of theirs, before completing the breathing focus task. Mood Rating 
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Scales measuring depression, anxiety and happiness were completed at various points 
during the study. 
1.15.4 Hypotheses. 
The study had the following hypotheses: 
1. Inducing verbal worry leads to a stronger attentional bias for threat-related words 
on the dot probe task than inducing imagery-based worry. 
2. There will be specificity effects in the Imagery group in which attentional bias 
will be more evident toward threat words relating specifically to what participants worry 
about, whereas this effect will not be present in the Verbal group. 
3. In replication of Stokes and Hirsch (2010), inducing verbal worry will lead to a 
significantly higher frequency of negative intrusions in a breathing-focus task than inducing 
imagery-based worry. 





This section first describes the two pilot phases of the study, before detailing the 
recruitment procedure for the main experiment. The materials used in the study are then 
briefly summarised before the experimental procedure is described. Finally, ethical 
considerations of the study are listed along with a summary of how the study deals with 
these. 
2.2 Pilots 
There were two stages of piloting the experimental procedures to be used in the 
main experiment. 
2.2.1 Pilot one. 
Six participants were included in this pilot (six females; mean PSWQ score = 67). 
This pilot was conducted in order to determine the duration of word pair exposure on the 
dot probe tasks that would be most likely to demonstrate a significant effect. This pilot 
consisted of a pre-dot probe task followed by Verbal worry induction in which participants 
worried in a verbal way about a current concern of theirs for a total of 6 minutes, and then 
participants completed a post-dot probe task. Each dot probe task had three randomised 
SOAs: 200 ms, 750 ms and 1250ms, and lasted approximately 20 minutes. Each word pair 
contained one neutral word and one threat word. There were 40 word pairs in total, 
repeated once in each condition (Threat-Top/Probe-Top; Threat-Top/Probe-Bottom; 
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Threat-Bottom/Probe-Top; Threat-Bottom/Probe-Bottom), giving rise to 160 trials in each 
dot probe task. The dot probe tasks only differed by having different threat and neutral 
word stimuli. 
Looking at the descriptive statistics did not unveil any obvious differences between 
RTs to probes replacing threat words compared with RTs to probes replacing neutral words, 
nor was there any obvious difference between  RTs on the pre- or post-dot probe tasks. It 
was reasoned that a fatigue effect might be obscuring a difference between the pre- and 
post-dot probe tasks, as participants were becoming demonstrably tired (e.g., yawning) 
during the post-dot probe task. Although neither of the stimulus exposure latencies showed 
any obvious effect, the 200 ms latency showed the strongest trend toward an effect. It was 
reasoned that strategic avoidance might have set in by the later SOAs (cf. the vigilance 
avoidance hypothesis of Mogg et al., 2004). A latency of 200 ms was chosen for the next 
pilot, in order to counteract the effects of attentional avoidance at later SOAs (this was the 
SOA chosen by Mogg and Bradley [2006], which showed attentional bias for threat 
whereas SOAs of 500 and 2000 ms did not). An SOA of 200 ms would also be beneficial as 
it would make the dot probe task shorter in duration, thereby limiting the effects of fatigue 
on task performance. 
2.2.2 Pilot two. 
The purpose of the second pilot was to investigate whether an SOA of 200 ms 
would show an attentional bias effect on Threat-Neutral trials. Given that this adjusted dot 
probe task would be shorter also due to only one SOA being included, Neutral-Neutral 
trials were also included in order to see whether the current study could replicate the results 
of Oathes et al. (2010), in which worry led to a speeding on Threat-Neutral trials relative to 
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Neutral-Neutral trials. Nine participants were included in this pilot (five females and four 
males; mean PSWQ = 64). 
There was only one dot probe task in pilot two in order to reduce fatigue effects. 
First of all, participants completed a verbal worry induction, identically to pilot one. The 
dot probe task then followed, which included 160 Threat-Neutral trials just like each of the 
dot probe tasks in pilot one. There were also 160 Neutral-Neutral trials, making a total of 
320 trials. This dot probe task lasted approximately 15 minutes. 
The descriptive statistics did not indicate any obvious differences between RTs to 
probes replacing threat words compared with RTs to probes replacing neutral words. There 
was a suggestion in the descriptive statistics of an effect of Trial Type (i.e., Threat-Neutral 
or Neutral-Neutral), in which mean RTs were faster on the former. This was in keeping 
with what Oathes et al. (2010) had found in their study. Based on these pilots, an SOA of 
200 ms was chosen for the main experiment and Threat-Neutral and Neutral-Neutral word 
pairs were retained in order to repeat the analysis carried out by Oathes et al., as well as to 
help to pinpoint the nature of any attentional bias that might emerge (i.e., whether the 
engage or the disengage component of attention is affected). 
2.3 Recruitment 
An e-mail was sent via King‟s College London Circular to King‟s University staff 
and students, detailing inclusion/exclusion criteria for taking part in the study and inviting 
those who were interested to email the experimenter for more information. All those who 
indicated an interest received an information sheet for the study via email, as well as a 
consent form to read through (see Appendix 1). They were also sent the PSWQ to complete 
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and return to the experimenter. 55 or below were informed that they were not eligible to 
take part; those who scored 56 or above were invited to come to the Institute of Psychiatry, 
Kings College London to attend the experimental session. Participants were also recruited 
via an advert on Gumtree and those who registered an interest were dealt with in the same 
way. Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the different stages of recruitment. 









2.4 Sample Size Calculation 
A power analysis was conducted to estimate the required sample size for the 
breathing focus task. The difference found in a study by Stokes and Hirsch (2010) between 
the mean frequency of negative intrusions post-worry in verbal and imagery groups (1.66) 
was entered into G*Power Version 3.1.2, along with the standard deviations of these 
groups (1.84 and 1.21, respectively), which estimated that both groups in the study would 
need a sample size of 15 in order to provide 80% power to detect an effect size of δ = 
1.066, with an alpha level of 0.05. 
Agreed to take part  
n = 97 
Attended  
n = 60 
Invited to take part due to 
meeting PSWQ cut-off and 
other inclusion criteria  
n = 127 [Circular Email] 
n = 68 [Gumtree] 
 
Did not agree/reply 
n = 98 
 
Did not attend 
n = 37 
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As this was the first study of its kind to look at between-group differences in 
attentional bias following Verbal/Imagery training, it was not possible to conduct a power 
analysis by looking at previous research. However, it was already known that experimental 
manipulations in one domain of processing can affect congruent changes in other domains. 
For example, in a study by Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams and Morrison (2003), low 
socially anxious participants instructed to imagine themselves in a given social situation 
demonstrated a benign inferential bias on an interpretation task, whereas this benign 
inferential bias was not evident for those participants who were instructed to hold in mind a 
negative self-image while performing the same interpretation task. Furthermore, pilot 
studies were conducted in order to test the sensitivity of this methodology to changes in 
attentional bias due to differences in how one engages in worry. Finally, the current study is 
conservative in including significantly more participants than that indicated in the power 
analysis for the breathing focus task, i.e., 25 per group rather than 15 per group, increasing 
its chances of detecting a significant effect in the dot-probe task should one exist.  
2.5 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Participants were only included in the study if they spoke English as their first 
language, were between 18 and 65 years of age and had high levels of worry, as indicated 
by a score of 56 or above on the PSWQ. Five people were excluded on the basis of no 
longer meeting cut-off on the PSWQ on attending. 
Participants were excluded from the study if they failed to reach the required level 
of thinking on the final Scenario Scale of the worry training phase (see Section 2.7.4.3), 
i.e., no less than 60% in their designated thinking style (verbal or imagery-based) and no 
more than 40% in their non-designated thinking style (verbal or imagery-based). 
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Participants were also excluded from the study if their failed to think negative thoughts at 
least 60% of the time on this final Scenario Scale. All participants reached these criteria by 
the end of the worry training phase, except for two from the Imagery group who requested 
that the experimental session be discontinued due to finding the training to be stressful. A 
Fisher‟s Exact Test found no significant difference between the Verbal and Imagery groups 
on the number of participants who were excluded for this reason (See Table 1). 
Participants were excluded from the study if they failed to reach the required level 
of thinking in their designated thinking style in either the first or middle worry phase.  A 
Fisher‟s Exact Test found no significant difference between the Verbal and Imagery groups 
on the number of participants who were excluded for this reason (See Table 1). Participants 
were also excluded if they did not reach the required level of negative thinking on either of 
the Manipulation Check Scales (see Section 2.7.4.4) following the first worry phase or 
following the middle worry phase (same requirements as for the final Scenario Scale of the 
worry training phase). 
Table 1. Participants excluded from Verbal and Imagery groups. 
 Group N Fisher‟s exact test p value 
<60% designated or >40% 
non-designated thinking 
style in first or middle 
worry phases 




Did not wish to continue 
with experiment 
Verbal 0 .491 
Imagery 2 
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2.6 Materials 
2.6.1 Generating and piloting the word stimuli. 
Word stimuli were taken from the American Heritage Word Frequency Book 
(Carroll, Davies & Richman, 1971) and each pair of words was matched on word length 
(i.e., number of letters). Forty Threat-Neutral word pairs and 40 Neutral-Neutral word pairs 
were developed. The Threat-Neutral and Neutral-Neutral word pair groups were matched 
for word frequency on the Standard Frequency Index (SFI) as well as word length. Within 
the Threat-Neutral word corpus, the average SFI of threat-related words was matched with 
that of the neutral words. 
Threat-related words were chosen to fit the domains of worry identified by Tallis, 
Eysenck and Mathews (1992) in the development of the Worry Domains Questionnaire 
(WDQ). The domains are: Relationships, lack of confidence, aimless future, work 
incompetence, financial and socio-political, and the authors identified five subdomains 
within each domain. Two domains were added in the current study: Physical and social, as 
it was felt from clinical experience that these prevalent worry domains should be 
represented. Five subdomains were added to these two domains. Some threat words were 
picked from MacLeod and McLaughlin‟s (1995) word set, whereas others were chosen 
separately at the experimenter‟s discretion in order to represent all the domains. One word 
was chosen for each subdomain for the eight domains, giving 40 threat words. 
A word rating program was administered to seven participants and only those words 
with a mean rating of -1 or below (i.e., at least “mildly threatening”) were included. It 
proved difficult to find threat-related words that were both sufficiently threatening and 
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representative of their subdomain. It was judged more important for a word to be 
threatening; therefore, words for some subdomains were substituted for words from another 
subdomain ascribed a higher mean threat rating by the participants. 
Neutral-Neutral word pairs did not fall under particular categories. Some were 
chosen from MacLeod and McLaughlin‟s (1995) word set, others were taken from the word 
set used by Oathes et al. (2010) in their study (via personal correspondence), whereas 
others were chosen by the experimenter. The Threat-Neutral and Neutral-Neutral word 
pairs of the dot probe practice task and the two halves of the main dot probe task, as well as 
the worry domains of the Threat-Neutral pairs, are to be found in Appendices 2 and 3. 
2.6.2 Scenarios. 
Six worry scenarios used by the research team were used, the first four of which 
represented the following worry domains: Financial, social, physical and relationship. The 
last two scenarios represented a mixture of worries. 
2.7 Measures 
2.7.1 Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
The PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990) is a measure of worry that has good psychometric 
properties in student, community, and clinical samples, with studies reporting high internal 
consistency, short-term retest reliability, and convergent and criterion related validity 
(Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Davey, 1993). Prior research with college samples 
(Molina & Borkovec, 1994) found a PSWQ score of 56 to fall one standard deviation 
below the mean of individuals diagnosed with GAD by the Anxiety Disorders Interview 
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Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994). Participants in the 
present study were classed as being high worriers if they scored 56 or above on the PSWQ. 
2.7.2 Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI-trait). 
The STAI-trait (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983) was 
administered, which is a measure of trait anxiety. The STAI-trait has demonstrated good 
convergent validity (Peterson & Reiss, 1987; Merckelbach, De Jong & Muris, 1990), 
concurrent validity (Spielberger et al., 1995) and construct validity (Smeets, Merckelbach 
& Griez, 1997). Its test-retest reliability is also good (Rule & Traver, 1983). 
2.7.3 Worry Domains Questionnaire. 
The WDQ (Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 1992) is a measure of worry. One hundred 
and fifty five worry items were chosen from the statements of a voluntary community 
sample and these were entered into a cluster analysis, resulting in various worry domains. 
Although only the five most frequently endorsed domains were included in the final 
questionnaire, this study included all six domains, to maximise the range of worries 
represented in the word stimuli (see Section 2.6.1). Diefenbach et al. (2001) showed the 
WDQ to have adequate internal consistency for clinical and control populations. 
A modified version of the WDQ was given to participants during the study, which 
included four extra items, two reflecting social worries, two reflecting physical worries. 
2.7.4 Visual analogue scales. 
See Appendices 4-8 for copies of the Visual Analogue Scales. 
2.7.4.1 Mood rating scales. 
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Three Mood Rating Scales were completed by participants at various points during 
the study (see Section 2.10.4). Each comprised a 10 cm line flanked by two words. For the 
anxiety visual analogue scale, the words were “not at all anxious” and “extremely anxious”. 
For the depression visual analogue scale, the words were “not at all depressed” and 
“extremely depressed”. For the happiness visual analogue scale, the words were “not at all 
happy” and “extremely happy”. Participants indicated their current mood on the Mood 
Rating Scales by marking a cross (x) on each scale at some point between the two 
extremes. 
Mood Rating Scales administered during each of the three worry phases included an 
extra question asking participants to rate the extent to which they were currently distressed 
about their worry topic (0 – 100). 
2.7.4.2 Worry rating scales. 
On the Worry Rating Scale participants rated the extent to which each identified 
worry was “Personally Relevant” and “Distressing”, by marking a cross somewhere on a 10 
cm line between two extremes which represented “Not at all” and “Totally”. 
2.7.4.3 Scenario scales. 
After reading the practice scenario in the worry training phase participants 
completed the Practice Scenario Scale, in which they rated on a scale of 0 - 100 the extent 
to which they were thinking in their designated thinking style (Verbal or Imagery) and the 
extent to which they were thinking in their non-designated thinking style. 
After reading each of the scenarios in the worry training phase participants 
completed a Scenario Scale, the first part of which was identical to the practice scenario 
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scale, but which also required participants to rate the proportion of their thinking that was 
positive, negative and neutral during the time they thought about the scenario as well as the 
extent to which the scenario represented something that had been concerning them recently 
(“not at all”, “moderately”, “highly”, “extremely”). 
2.7.4.4 Manipulation check scales. 
Participants completed Manipulation Check Scales after each of the three worry 
phases in order to ensure that they had been thinking according to their designated thinking 
style as well as reaching the required level of negative thinking. These scales required 
participants to rate on a scale of 0 – 100 the extent to which they were thinking in their 
designated thinking style and the extent to which they were thinking in their non-designated 
thinking style, and also to rate the proportion of their thinking that was positive, negative 
and neutral during the time they were worrying. 
2.8 Experimental Tasks 
2.8.1 Dot probe training task. 
Participants were asked to sit at a laptop (Sony Vaio) and were provided verbal and 
computer-generated instructions informing them of the nature of the task. These 
instructions explained that a series of visual displays consisting of two words, separated 
vertically by approximately 3 cm, would be presented on the computer monitor. 
Participants were told that a symbol, either “.” or “..” would appear immediately following 
the disappearance of the word pair in either the position of the top or bottom word, which 
would require one of two responses each time: Pressing either “c” or “m” on the keyboard 
(which were labelled with “.” and “..”, respectively), to match the symbol on the screen. 
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They were told to respond to the dot as quickly as possible without making mistakes. 
Participants then completed five trials as practice. 
Each practice trial consisted of a fixation cross presented for 1000 ms in the middle 
of the screen, followed by two words presented vertically – all Neutral-Neutral word pairs.  
Each word pair was presented for 200 ms before the presentation of a small dot probe, 
replacing one of the words. 
The dot probe training task was made a separate task that took place before the 
experimental manipulation (the first worry phase) rather than taking place just before the 
main dot probe task, in order to minimise the dissipation of worry before participants 
commenced the main dot probe task. 
2.8.2 Worry training phase. 
Participants in the Verbal group were asked to think in words, sentences and 
questions about the topic of “friendship” for 30 seconds, as a practice task. Those in the 
Imagery group were asked to imagine a scenario relating to the concept of “friendship” 
using all their senses, for 30 seconds. Following this practice scenario, participants went on 
to think about four negative scenarios in the same way, depending on their designated 
thinking style, particularly focusing on each scenario as if it were happening to them and 
focusing on the negative aspects of each scenario. Participants were asked to think about 
scenarios one to four for 1 minute, 1 ½  minutes, 2 minutes and 2 minutes, respectively. 
Participants were only administered scenario five if they had not reached the required level 
of thinking on scenario four, i.e., no less than 60% in their designated thinking style and no 
more than 40% in their non-designated thinking style, as well thinking negative thoughts at 
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least 60% of the time. Participants were only administered scenario six if they had not 
reached these criteria on scenario five. 
2.8.3 First worry phase. 
Participants‟ first identified worry topic was briefly discussed with the experimenter 
in order to activate the worry in the participant‟s mind and to ensure that it was connected 
with a negative future event. Participants went on to worry for three blocks of 2 minutes 
each, in either a verbal or imagery-based way depending on their group allocation. The 
experimenter left the room to begin each worry period and returned at the end of each 2 
minute block. This phase was intended to activate the worry process before the dot probe 
task (first half). 
2.8.4 Dot probe task (first half). 
Participants completed the first half of the dot probe task. As in the dot probe 
training task, each trial began with a fixation cross presented for 1000 ms in the middle of 
the screen, followed by the presentation of a word pair. Half the trials displayed a Threat-
Neutral word pair and half a Neutral-Neutral word pair. Each Threat-Neutral pair was 
presented once in all four conditions (Threat-Top/Probe-Top; Threat-Top/Probe-Bottom; 
Threat-Bottom/Probe-Top; Threat-Bottom/Probe-Bottom), such that each threat word was 
presented equally often in the top location as in the bottom location. The order of word pair 
presentations was randomised. 
On each trial, the word pair was presented for 200 ms, after which a symbol was 
presented immediately (either “.” or “..”), replacing the top word on half the trials and 
replacing the bottom word on half the trials. The two symbols were presented an equal 
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number of times in total. Participants were instructed to respond by pressing either “c” or 
“m” on the keyboard (which were labelled with “.” and “..”, respectively), to match the 
symbol on the screen. They were told to respond to the dot as quickly as possible without 
making mistakes. This half lasted about 10 minutes. 
2.8.5 Middle worry phase. 
After the first half of the dot probe task there came a break, during which 
participants were asked to think about their worry topic for another 2 minutes in the same 
way as during the first worry phase, in order to reactivate their worry. The experimenter left 
the room for these 2 minutes. This phase was intended to re-activate worry before 
proceeding to the dot probe task (second half), as it was reasoned that worry would be 
likely to dissipate during the first half of the dot probe task. 
2.8.6 Dot probe task (second half). 
Participants then completed the second half of the dot-probe task, identical to the 
first half, except for different word pairs. This half also lasted about 10 minutes. 
2.8.7 Word rating task. 
Participants were asked to use a four-point scale to rate how related each of the 40 
threat words they had seen in the dot probe task was to what they had just been worrying 
about as the experimenter left the room during all the preceding worry periods. This ranged 
from “not at all related”, “slightly related”, “moderately related”, to “extremely related”. 
Participants were instructed to include in this rating of relatedness all the things that had 
come to mind during the first and middle worry phases, whether it related to what they had 
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agreed to worry about or whether it was extraneous material that had come to mind during 
the worry phases. 
2.8.8 Breathing focus training task. 
Participants were instructed to focus their attention on their breathing for a 20 
second practice, and not to concentrate on anything expect their breathing. They were told 
to notice when the mind had wandered during this task and then to bring their attention 
back to their breathing whenever this happened. Following this, participants were asked to 
do the same for an additional 45 seconds, as the computer generated a beep at random 
intervals. For each beep, each participant was asked to say “breathing” if they were 
focusing on their breathing at that point or to indicate where their mind had wandered to at 
that point, by saying “positive”, “neutral” or “negative” to indicate the contents of their 
thoughts, followed by one word to describe the content. Participants heard three beeps in 
total. 
The breathing focus training phase was made a separate task that took place before 
the experimental manipulation (the second worry phase) rather than taking place just before 
the main breathing focus task, in order to minimise the dissipation of worry before 
participants commenced the main breathing focus task. 
2.8.9 Second worry phase.  
Participants‟ second identified worry topic was briefly discussed with the 
experimenter in order to activate the worry in the participant‟s mind and to ensure that it 
was connected with a negative future event. Participants went on to worry for three blocks 
of 2 minutes each, in either a verbal or imagery-based way depending on their group 
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allocation. The experimenter left the room to begin each worry period and returned at the 
end of each 2 minute block. The second worry phase was intended to activate worry for the 
breathing focus task. 
2.8.10 Breathing focus task. 
Participants were asked to focus on their breathing just as before, for 5 minutes this 
time, as the computer generated beeps at random intervals. For each beep, participants were 
again asked say “breathing” if they were focusing on their breathing at that point or to 
indicate where their mind had wandered to at that point, by saying “positive”, “neutral” or 
“negative” to indicate the contents of their thoughts, followed by one word to describe the 
content. Participants heard 12 beeps in total. 
2.8.11 Expanded descriptions. 
Participants were asked to expand on the summaries they provided for each 
intrusion occurring during the training and main breathing focus task for an independent 
rater to categorise each of these as positive, neutral or negative in valence. 
2.9 Design 
This study adopted a mixed-model 2 x 2 x 2 design with one between-subjects 
factor of Group (Verbal; Imagery) and two within-subjects factors: Threat Position (Top; 
Bottom); Probe Position (Top; Bottom). The four combinations of threat position and probe 
position can be represented by Condition (Threat-Top/Probe-Top; Threat-Top/Probe-
bottom; Threat-Bottom/Probe-Top; Threat-Bottom/Probe-Bottom). The dependent variable 
was RT. 




Participants were randomised using a random number table, in which the first 
number represented the first participant, the second number the second participant, and so 
on. An even number randomised participants to the Verbal group, and an odd number to the 
Imagery group. After testing 30 participants, the mean age and PSWQ score of the groups 
were calculated, and randomisation then became stratified for these variables in order to 
generate groups with approximately equal mean age and PSWQ scores. Participant gender 
randomisation also became stratified after 30 participants in order to ensure a roughly equal 
gender ratio of the two groups. 
2.10.2 Payment. 
Participants were paid £15 for attending before the experimental session began. 
2.10.3 Verbal overview, information sheet and consent form. 
Before commencing the experimental session, participants were given a brief verbal 
overview of how the study would run and it was explained that the study could cause some 
distress. Participants were reassured that they could stop the study and leave at any time 
without giving a reason, should they feel the need to do so. Participants were then given an 
information sheet to read through and then a consent form to sign if they agreed to take part 
in the study. 
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2.10.4 Experimental protocol. 
The experimental protocol was conducted by one experimenter. On attending the 
experimental session participants were given to complete the PSWQ, the modified WDQ, 
the STAI-trait and the Mood Rating Scales. After this point, it is helpful to conceptualise 
the experimental session as divided into two parts that centre on two different experimental 
tasks. Part one centres on the dot probe task and part two centres on the breathing focus 
task. 
2.10.4.1 Part one: Dot probe task. 
Firstly, participants entered the dot probe task training phase. At the end of the dot 
probe training task participants completed the Mood Rating Scales. Participants then 
underwent the worry training phase, completing the Practice Scenario Scale after thinking 
about the practice scenario and then completing a Scenario Scale after thinking about each 
of the subsequent scenarios. Participants completed the Mood Rating Scales at the end of 
the worry training phase. 
Participants were then asked to identify two topics that they had been worrying 
about recently and completed the Worry Rating Scale. Participants then entered the first 
worry phase, at the end of which they completed one Manipulation Check Scale 
retrospectively for each 2 minute worry period and also completed the Mood Rating Scales. 
Following the first worry phase, participants completed the dot probe task (first half). Then 
participants entered the middle worry phase and completed a Manipulation Check Sheet for 
this 2 minute worry period as well as the Mood Rating Scales. Participants then completed 
the dot probe task (second half), before completing the word rating task.  
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2.10.4.2 Part two: Breathing focus task. 
Part two of the study began with the breathing focus training task. After the 
breathing focus training task participants completed the Mood Rating Scales, before 
entering the second worry phase. At the end of the second worry phase, participants 
completed one Manipulation Check Scale retrospectively for each 2 minute worry period, 
also completing the Mood Rating Scales. Participants then completed the breathing focus 
task and then the Mood Rating Scales, before finally completing the expanded descriptions. 
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Standardised questionnaires + Mood Rating Scales
Dot probe training  task+ Mood Rating Scales
Worry training phase + Practice Scenario Scale + 
Scenario Scales + Mood Rating Scales
Identify two worry topics + Worry Rating Scale
First worry phase + Manipulation Checks + Mood 
Rating Scales
Dot probe task (first half)
Middle worry phase + Manipulation Check s+ Mood 
Rating Scales
Dot probe task (second half)
Word rating task
Breathing focus training task + Mood Rating Scales
Second worry phase + Manipulation Checks + Mood 
Rating Scales
Breathing focus task + Mood Rating Scales
Expanded descriptions
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2.11 Ethical Considerations 
The principal ethical consideration in the study related to the potential for distress to 
participants during the experiment. The experimental manipulation of worry induction was 
deemed likely to increase levels of distress to some degree, although, based on previous 
experience of inducing worry in research participants, this effect was expected to be short-
lived and to be something that would dissipate rapidly on switching tasks. It was also 
anticipated that the training phase of the experiment, in which participants would be asked 
to either think to themselves about different negative scenarios happening to them (Verbal 
group) or to imagine themselves in those scenarios (Imagery group) could raise distress 
levels, although, again, this was expected to be short-lived. Viewing threat-related words on 
the screen during the dot-probe task was also considered to be a possible source of distress. 
It was also predicted that some participants might feel uncomfortable disclosing personal 
thoughts, either in the reporting of two current worries of theirs or in the reporting of 
intrusions during the breathing focus task. 
One method for addressing these issues was to list them in the information sheet 
and the aforementioned potential sources of distress were verbally explained to participants 
at the beginning of the experimental session. It was also stressed at the beginning of the 
experimental session that they were entitled to stop the study and leave at any point without 
giving a reason. If distress or discomfort was observed in the participant during the study, 
they were reminded of this option. Finally, distress and discomfort routinely discussed 
during the debriefing session at the end of the experiment and any residual negative 
emotional effects from the experiment were met with empathy and understanding by the 
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experimenter. Participants who wanted to know about methods of dealing with day-to-day 
worry were signposted to books and/or services that could offer support in this regard. 
Another ethical issue relates to confidentiality. Although all information gained 
from participants during the study was kept confidential, it was anticipated that some 
participants might disclose information indicating such a level of risk to themselves or 
others that a third party might need to be contacted. Participants were made aware of this in 
the information sheet. 
Another ethical consideration was whether participants should be told their score on 
the PSWQ, which they completed in order that the experimenter could screen for high-
worriers. It was decided that participants should not be informed of their score, as providing 
people with a score out of context would be meaningless for them. Rather, those who did 
not meet cut-off on the PSWQ were told that they did not meet the cut-off required in order 
to take part in the study. Those participants that expressed surprise or shock at this were 
informed that the PSWQ is not necessarily a true reflection of how distressing worry is for 
them and, if they feel that they are a high-worrier, their PSWQ score does not invalidate 
that in anyway. 
Finally, this study did not including those whose first language was not English. 
This was felt appropriate as the dot probe task looks at subtle differences in RTs to English 
words. This was explained over the phone or face to face to participants who were excluded 
from the study for this reason. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the King‟s College London ethics committee 
before the start of recruitment (reference number: PNM/10/11-71). 




3.1 Preparation of Reaction Time Data from the Dot Probe Task 
Data from both halves of the dot probe task were analysed together. Trials in which 
participants pressed the incorrect key were excluded from statistical analyses. The range of 
trials on which no errors were made was 88-100% and the mean accuracy was 98%. 
Median scores were extracted for each participant for every condition in the analyses in 
order to limit the effect of outlier RTs at extreme latencies.  
For each analysis that follows, data characteristics were examined for normality
1
  
and homogeneity of variance
2
. When any of these criteria were not met, this is noted along 
with any adjustments that were made to analyses. 
3.2 Sample Characteristics 
3.2.1 Between-groups comparisons. 
The two groups were compared on various measures to ensure that they were 
matched in all important respects apart from the experimental manipulation (see Table 2 for 
all analyses and results). For part one (dot probe task), there were 25 participants in each 
                                                 
1
 Normality was judged by visual inspection of Q-Q plots, the absence of extreme outliers (defined 
as SD > 2.5 beyond the mean) and skewness and kurtosis within |2|. 
 
2
 For ANOVAs, homogeneity of variances was deemed present if, in between-groups comparisons, 
the largest SD was not more than twice as large as the lowest between all the conditions being compared. For  
within-groups comparisons, Mauchly‟s Test of Sphericity was taken to indicate sphericity if p > .05. For 
independent samples t-tests, Levene‟s test for equality of variances was taken to indicate homogeneity of 
variances if p > .05. For paired samples t-tests, the Pitman-Morgan test was taken to indicate homogeneity of 
variances if p > .05. 
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group. Some participants from both groups did not complete the second part of the study, 
leaving a total of 42 participants who provided data for the second part of the study 
(breathing focus task) in addition to the first part (dot probe task). In both parts of the study, 
the groups did not differ significantly in PSWQ, STAI-trait, age or gender ratio, and picked 
worries that were matched for distress and personal relevance. There were no differences 
between the two groups in either part of the study with regard to anxiety and depression 
scores on the Mood Rating Scales following the worry periods, although in part two of the 
study the Verbal group had significantly lower happiness scores on the Mood Rating Scales 
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Table 2. Between-groups comparisons of demographics and scores on various measures in 
both parts of the experiment. 
Part one (dot probe 
task) 
Verbal [SD] [n 
= 25] 
Imagery [SD] 
[n = 25] 
Test Statistic and 
p value 





t(48) = .590; 
p = .558 
STAI-trait 57.360 [7.8150] 55.520 [8.4810] Independent 
samples t-
test 
t(48) = .798; 
p = .429 





Z = -.175; 
p = .861 








7.312 [1.7913] 7.036 [2.1620] Mann-
Whitney‟s U 
Test 





6.980 [1.7088] 7.092 [1.7272] Mann-
Whitney‟s U 
Test 





5.736 [2.8918] 5.156 [2.8088] MANOVA F(1, 48) = 
.517;  
p = .475;  




5.456 [2.7377] 4.908 [2.5982] MANOVA F(1, 48) = 
.527, p = 





3.704 [2.2238] 3.312 [1.7510] MANOVA F(1, 48) = 
.480,  
p = .492,  




3.408 [1.5780] 3.784 [2.0087] MANOVA F(1, 48) = 
.542, p = 
.465, η² = 
.011 
Worry one distress 7.960 [1.5703] 7.600 [1.6540] Independent-
samples t-
test 
t(48) = .789, 
p = .434 
Worry one personal 
relevance 
8.780 [1.2721] 8.600 [1.3829] Independent-
samples t-
test 
t(48) = .479, 
p = .634 
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Part two (breathing 
focus task) 
Verbal [SD] [n 
= 20] 
Imagery [SD] 
[n = 22] 









t(40) = .509; 








t(40) = .681; 
p = .500 





Z = -.455; 
P = .649 
Gender 17 females 18 females Fisher‟s 
Exact Test 




7.2050 [1.8972] 6.4545 [2.1852] Mann-
Whitney‟s U 
Test 
Z = -1.323;  
























t(40) =  
-2.021;  
p = .050 
Worry two distress 7.965 [2.1139] 7.9318 [1.5270] Independent-
samples t-
test 
t(40) = .059, 
p = .953 
Worry two personal 
relevance 




1.153, p = 
.258 
Note: Numbers in curved brackets = degrees of freedom; η² = effect size.  
Analyses were conducted to investigate differential drop out effects in part two of 
the study. There was no disproportionate exclusion of participants in either group in part 
two of the study due to either reason for exclusion: Not reach the minimum amount of 
thinking in the designated thinking style (60%) during the last 2 minutes of the second 
worry phase; Not reaching the minimum amount of negative thinking (60%) in those 2 
minutes; Not wishing to continue on to the second part of the study (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Numbers of participants excluded from Verbal and Imagery groups due to three 
criteria. 
 Group N Fishers exact test p value 
<60% designated or >40% 
non-designated thinking 
style in last 2 minutes of 
second worry phase 
Verbal 1 1.0 
 
Imagery 0 
<60% negative thoughts in 
last 2 minutes of second 
worry phase 
Verbal 2 1.0 
Imagery 3 
Did not wish to continue to 
second part of experiment 
Verbal 2 .490 
Imagery 0 
 
3.2.2 Within-groups comparisons. 
As the experimental session was long and involved many tasks, it was deemed 
important to investigate fatigue effects (see Table 4 for all analyses and results). As fatigue 
might manifest in participants‟ mood, within-groups analyses were conducted to compare 
levels of anxiety on the Mood Rating Scales following worry phase, and no significant 
difference was found. However, levels of anxiety on the Mood Rating Scales were found to 
be significantly higher following the first worry phase than the second worry phase. 
The relatively lesser anxiety reported by the Imagery group after the second worry 
phase compared with the first did not seem to be due to participants having chosen 
significantly less anxiety-provoking second worries than first worries, as no significant 
differences were found in either group between the extent to which participants had initially 
rated each of their worries as distressing. 
It was reasoned that adherence to thinking style might also correlate with fatigue. 
There was a significant difference in the Verbal group between adherence to designated 
thinking style in the final 2 minutes of the first worry phase and in the final 2 minutes of the 
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second worry phase, in which participants thought significantly less in a verbal way in the 
final 2 minutes of the second worry phase than the final two minutes of the first worry 
phase. In the Imagery group, no such difference was found. 
Table 4. Within-groups comparisons of scores on various measures. 
 Verbal 





[n = 22] 
Test Statistic 










Z = -.765, 












































































 Note: Numbers in curbed brackets = degrees of freedom. 
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3.3 Hypothesis One: Inducing Verbal Worry Leads to a Stronger Attentional Bias for 
Threat-Related Words on the Dot Probe Task than Inducing Imagery-Based Worry 
3.3.1 Congruency effect. 
As the presence of attentional bias has been traditionally investigated by looking at 
the congruency effect of Threat Position x Probe Position (e.g., Mogg, Mathews & 
Eysenck, 1992), a mixed-model 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was performed with these variables as 
within-subjects factors and Group as a between-subjects factor. Neutral-Neutral trials were 
not included in this analysis as they do not contain a threat word to be probed. 
Although Q-Q plots of the four within-subjects Conditions to be entered into the 
ANOVA, resulting from four combinations of threat location and probe location (Threat 
Top/Probe Top; Threat Top/Probe Bottom; Threat Bottom/Probe Top; Threat Bottom/Probe 
Bottom) were found to be approximately normal, two extreme outliers were found in the 
box plots, both in the Imagery group
3
. Analyses were performed with extreme outliers 
included. When analyses were repeated excluding extreme outliers, all significant effects 
were retained (see Appendix 9). 
The mixed-model 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA analysis with extreme outliers included 
revealed a main effect of Probe Position (F(1, 48) = 94.528, p < 0.001, η²  = .663). The 
estimated marginal mean scores indicated faster responses to probes appearing in the Top 
position than the Bottom (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Means and standard errors of probes by location. 
                                                 
3
 A logarithmic transformation was conducted but these outliers remained, therefore this 
transformation was not used. 
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Probe Position Estimated marginal mean [n 
= 50] 
Standard error 
Top 500.275 8.270 
Bottom 520.785 8.824 
  
This was qualified by an interaction effect of Probe Position x Group (F(1, 48) = 
6.306, p = .015, η² = .116), in which the speeding toward probes in the top position relative 
to those in the bottom position was significantly less in the Verbal group compared with the 
Imagery group. 
 Although there was no interaction effect of Threat Position x Probe Position (F(1, 
48) = 1.121, p = .295, η² = .023), a significant three-way interaction was obtained: Threat 
Position x Probe Position x Group (F(1, 48) = 5.156, p = .028, η² = .097). There was no 
significant main effect of Group (F(1, 48) = 1.053; p = .310; η² = .021). 
This three-way interaction prompted further analyses as to its nature. Two separate 
repeated measures ANOVAS were conducted for the Verbal and Imagery groups, retaining 
extreme outliers to begin with. When analyses were repeated excluding extreme outliers, all 
significant effects were retained (see Appendix 9). 
A significant Threat Position x Probe Position interaction was found only for the 
Verbal group (F(1, 24) = 4.275,  p =.050, η² = .151) as well as the main effect of Probe 
Position (F(1, 24), p < 0.001, η² = .440). In the Imagery group the main effect of Probe 
Position held (F(1, 24) = 120.724, p < .001, η² = .834) but the Threat Position x Probe 
Position interaction was non-significant (F(1, 24) = 1.044, p = .317, η² = .042). 
A series of Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons (see Table 6) indicated that, 
while probes appearing on the Top received faster responses than probes appearing on the 
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Bottom in both Imagery and Verbal groups, only in the Verbal group was the speeding 
effect of probes appearing on the Top less when the threat word appeared at the Bottom 
(517 ms) than when the threat word also appeared at the Top (508.68 ms). Hence it seems 
that Threat Position moderates the effect of Probe Position only in the Verbal group. These 
results are summarised Figures 1 and 2. 
Table 6. Pairwise comparisons of the Threat Position x Probe Position x Group interaction, 










Verbal [n = 
25] 
Top 508.68 538.70 -30.020 p < .001 
Bottom 517.00 532.24 -15.240 p = .011 
Imagery [n = 
25] 
Top 488.92 524.62 -35.700 p < .001 
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Figures 3 and 4. Graphs of RTs by Condition (Threat Top/Probe Top; Threat Top/Probe 
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These graphs are comparable to those produced by MacLeod et al. (1986) as well as 
Mogg et al. (1992) in showing group differences in attentional bias for threat. 
3.3.2 Attentional bias index. 
To further investigate hypothesis one, the traditional Attentional Bias Index (ABI) 
was calculated for the two groups, using the following calculation: 
RT to probes at neutral location – RT to probes at threat location. 
(Conditions Threat-Top/Probe-Bottom and Threat-Bottom/Probe-Top that were 
entered into the 3-way ANOVA were collapsed to make “RT to probes at neutral location”, 
whereas Threat-Top/Probe-Top and Threat-Bottom/Probe-Bottom were collapsed to make 
“RT to probes at threat location”).4 
Two one-sample t-tests compared ABI scores of the two groups with 0. The ABI 
score of the Verbal group was significantly larger than 0 (t(24) = 2.068, p = .0050; 
reflecting speeded responses to threat words relative to neutral words) whereas the ABI 
score of the Imagery group did not significantly differ from 0  (t(24) = -2.6900, p = .317). 
Means of these ABI scores are found in Table 7. 
                                                 
4
 N.B. although the ABI scores that clarified the 3-way interaction were derived by collapsing the 
Conditions used in the 3-way ANOVA, ABI scores that are reported in subsequent sections were derived 
directly from the dataset by taking the median RTs of trials in which the threat word is probed and the 
median RTs of trials in which the threat word is not probed, and then producing ABI scores in the same 
fashion (i.e., RT to probes at neutral location – RT to probes at threat location). 
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Table 7. Mean ABI scores, by Group. 
Group Mean ABI [SD] 
Verbal [n = 25] 7.390 [17.8712] 
Imagery [n = 25] -2.6900 [12.1651] 
 
An independent samples t-test was also conducted, which showed the ABI score of 
the Verbal group to be significantly larger than the ABI score of the Imagery group (t(48) = 
2.271), p = .028). This reflected significantly more speeded responses to threat words in the 
Verbal group relative to the Imagery group. 
3.4 Hypothesis Two: There Will Be Specificity Effects in the Imagery Group, in 
Which Attentional Bias Will Be Evident toward Threat Words Relating to 
Participants’ Specific Concerns, Whereas This Effect Will Not Be Present in the 
Verbal Group 
3.4.1 Word rating task. 
In order to examine any effect of relevance of threat words to what participants had 
worried about during the first and second worry phases, and how this might differ by 
Group, a four-way ANOVA was conducted with an additional within-subjects factor of 
Relevance (Relevance x Threat Position x Probe Position x Group). Relevance only 
included words that participants had rated as either “not at all related” or “highly related” to 
what they had thought about during the first worry phase. Four participants‟ data were 
removed from this analysis as they had not provided RT data for threat words that were not 
at all related or highly related to what they had worried about, either due to not having 
endorsed any words on the word rating task as falling into these categories, or due to the 
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exclusion of incorrect responses on the dot probe task (see Section 3.1). This resulted in 
unequal sample sizes
5
 (Verbal: 21; Imagery: 25).  
Some kurtosis and skewness values exceeded |2|, there were four extreme outliers in 
the Imagery group and two in the Verbal group, and the homogeneity of variance 
assumption was not met, as indicated by the highest standard deviation between the two 
groups being more than twice the size of the lowest. A logarithmic transformation did not 
resolve these issues; therefore, a reciprocal (1/x) transformation was performed on the data, 
which provided homogeneous variances and skewness values within |2|, and also resolved 
extreme outliers. One kurtosis value remained outside of |2| but this was not deemed too 
problematic as visual inspection of the relevant Q-Q plot and histogram indicated an 
approximately normal, unimodal distribution; therefore, the analysis was still conducted. 
The four-way interaction of interest (Relevance x Threat Position x Probe Position x 
Group) was non-significant (F(1, 44) = .431;  p = .515, η² = .010). 
An additional method for examining any effect of relevance of threat words to what 
participants had worried about in the first and middle worry phases was to calculate the 
ABI for the same two relevance ratings (not at all related; highly related). ABI was entered 
as dependent variables into a mixed-model 2 x 2 ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of 
Relevance (Not At All Related; Highly Related) and a between-subjects factor of Group 
(Verbal; Imagery). There were unequal sample sizes here for the same reasons as in the 
                                                 
5
 Although unequal sample sizes can exaggerate the consequences of homogeneity of variances 
(Myers & Well, 1995), the homogeneity of variance assumption held in all analyses in which there were 
unequal sample sizes and therefore unequal samples were unlikely to have strongly impacted on the results. 
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previous analysis (Verbal: 22; Imagery: 25). There was no main effect of Relevance (F(1, 
45) = .484, p = .490, η² = .011) nor a Relevance x Group interaction (F(1, 45) = .181, p = 
.672, η² = .004).  
A “highest” and “lowest” domain was calculated for each participant by adding up 
the relevance values each participant had allocated to each threat word on the word rating 
task (0 = not at all related; 1 = mildly related; 2 = moderately related; 3 = highly related), 
and then assigning each participant with their highest and lowest worry domain, from the 
following: 1. Relationships; 2. Lack of confidence; 3. Aimless Future; 4. Work 
incompetence; 5. Financial; 6. Socio-political; 7. Physical; 8. Social. If there were two or 
more domains calculated as highest/lowest then the domain that comes first in the arbitrary 
sequence shown above was chosen. 
Domain (Highest/Lowest) was entered into a four-way ANOVA (Domain x Threat 
Position x Probe Position x Group). There were equal sample sizes in this analysis (n = 25 
for both groups). Some kurtosis and skewness values exceeded |2|, which was resolved 
following a logarithmic transformation, although there remained one extreme outlier in the 
Verbal group and three in the Imagery group. The four-way interaction of interest (Domain 
x Threat Position x Probe Position x Group) was non-significant (F(1, 48) = .164;  p = .687, 
η² = .003). 
ABIs were calculated for the “Highest” and “Lowest” domains, calculated from 
participants‟ responses on the word rating task, as before. In the Verbal group, skewness 
and kurtosis exceeded |2| in the highest worry domain and kurtosis exceeded |2| in the 
lowest worry domain. There were also three extreme outliers in Verbal group. Therefore, 
two Mann-Whitney‟s U tests were conducted, each of which had equal sample sizes (n = 25 
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for both groups). These tests showed no significant differences between the groups either in 
RTs to words in the Highest domain (Z = -.951, p = .342) or the Lowest domain (Z = -.815, 
p = .415). 
In order to explore whether the two groups differed in the number of highly relevant 
words that they had identified on the worry rating task, the number of words rated by each 
participant as highly relevant was extracted. The distribution of the Verbal group contained 
an extreme outlier and therefore the groups were compared using a Mann-Whitney‟s U 
Test, which showed no significant difference between the groups on the mean number of 
words rated by participants as highly relevant to their worry (Z = -.476, p = .634). 
3.4.2 Worry domains questionnaire. 
An additional method for assessing the effect of relevance was to derive 
Highest/Lowest worry domains from participants‟ responses on the WDQ, which again was 
achieved by adding up all the items within each domain. The presence of two or more 
highest/lowest domains was handled in the same fashion as in the previous section. 
A four-way ANOVA was conducted (Relevance x Threat Position x Probe Position 
x Group). Some kurtosis and skewness values exceeded |2| and the homogeneity of 
variance assumption was not met. These were not resolved following a logarithmic 
transformation, and therefore a reciprocal (1/x) transformation was conducted, after which 
skewness and kurtosis values were all within |2| and variances were homogeneous. Sample 
sizes were unequal: (Verbal n = 22; Imagery n = 23). The four-way interaction of interest 
(Relevance x Threat Position x Probe Position x Group) was non-significant (F(1, 48) = 
1.184;  p = .282, η² = .024). 
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The ABI was also calculated for Highest/Lowest worry domains from participants‟ 
responses on the WDQ. There were three conditions in which kurtosis exceeded |2|, two in 
the Verbal group and one in the Imagery group. There were also three extreme outliers in 
the Verbal group. Therefore, two Mann-Whitney‟s U Test was performed to compare the 
groups. The two groups did not differ from each other: Highest (Z = -.039, p = .969); 
Lowest (Z = -.427, p = .669). 
3.5 Subsidiary Analyses of the Dot Probe Task 
3.5.1 Engage and disengage components of attention. 
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere and Houwer (2004) adapted the dot probe task to 
allow for a decomposition of engage and disengage components of attention, as a positive 
ABI score can only indicate attentional bias for threat but not whether this constitutes a bias 
of the engage or disengage components of attention. This was achieved by adding Neutral-
Neutral trials that are always probed, i.e., trials in which there is not a threat word but both 
words are neutral in valence. This provided a baseline measure of RTs to visual stimuli. By 
comparing the baseline RTs on Neutral-Neutral trials to probes replacing either threat 
words or neutral words on Threat-Neutral trials, the dot probe allowed for the engage and 
disengage components of attention to be investigated. 
Salemink et al. (2007) provided two equations to represent the calculations 
proposed by Koster et al. (2004). Salemink et al. originally named these Orienting Index 
and Disengaging Index, but in the current study these will be known as Engage Index and 
Disengage Index, respectively: 
Engage Index: dN,N – dT,N 
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Disengage Index: dN,T – dN,N 
where dN,N = Neutral-Neutral trial; dT,N = Threat-Neutral trials on which the 
probe replaces the threat word; dN,T = Threat-Neutral trials on which the probe replaces 
the neutral word.  
Two independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare the Engage and 
Disengage Indices of both groups. Levene‟s test for equality of variances was significant in 
both cases and therefore statistical corrections were made for unequal variances. No 
significant difference was found between the Engage Index of the Verbal and Imagery 
groups (t(38.718) = .634, p = .530), nor  between the Disengage Index of the two groups 
(t(39.338) = -.790, p = .434). To test whether the Engage and Disengage Indices of the two 
groups differed from 0, two one-sample t-tests were carried out. For the Verbal group, the 
Engage Index did not differ significantly from 0 (t(24) = .239, p = .813), nor did the 
Disengage Index (t(24) = -.218, p = .829). For the Imagery group, the Engage Index did not 
differ significantly from 0 (t(24) = .239, p = .813), nor did the Disengage Index (t(24) = 
1.171, p = .253). 
3.5.2 Vigilance. 
In order to determine the presence of a general vigilance effect, as indicated by the 
results of Oathes et al. (2010; see Section 1.14) a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted (Probe 
Position x Trial Type x Group), with equal sample sizes (n = 25 for both groups). One 
extreme outlier was found in the Imagery group. There was a main effect of Probe Position 
(F(1, 48) = 105.102, p < .001, η² = .686) but Trial Type showed a non-significant trend 
(F(1, 48) = 3.102, p = .085, η² = .061), in which responses were slower on Threat-Neutral 
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trials than Neutral-Neutral trials (see Table 8). There was no significant Trial Type x Group 
interaction (F(1, 48) = 1.851, p = .180, η² = .037). No three-way interaction was found of 
Probe Position x Trial Type x Group (F(1, 48) = 1.162, p = .286, η² = .024), somewhat 
contrary to what had been found by Oathes et al. 
Table 8. Mean RTs by Trial Type. 
Trial Type Mean [Standard Error of the 
Mean] 
Threat-Neutral 515.935 [8.228] 
Neutral-Neutral 512.990 [8.152] 
 
3.6 Hypothesis Three: The Verbal Group Will Show a Significantly Higher Frequency 
of Negative Intrusions Following the Breathing Focus Task than the Imagery Group 
The numbers of negative intrusions in both groups were statistically compared. Two 
independent raters were trained to rate the expanded descriptions provided by 11 
participants following the breathing focus task. A kappa value of .882 was calculated for 
inter-rater reliability, which is within the outstanding range of correlation, according to 
Landis and Koch (1997). One rater then proceeded to rate the expanded descriptions of the 
remaining 31 participants. A two-way ANOVA was then conducted with a between-
subjects factor of Group (Verbal; Imagery) and a within-subjects factor of Rater (Self; 
Independent). There was a main effect of Rater (F(1, 40) = 9.536, p =  .004, η² = .193), in 
which participants rated significantly more intrusions as being negative than the 
independent rater (see Table 9). There was no main effect of Group (F(1, 40) = 2.881, p = 
.097, η² = .067) and no significant interaction effect between Rater and Group (F(1, 40) = 
.022, p = .884, η² = .001). 
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Table 9. Mean number of negative intrusions as rated by participants and independent 
raters, by Group. 
 Group Mean Negative Intrusions 
[SD] 
Independent rating Verbal [n = 20] 2.0500 [1.3945] 
Imagery [n = 22] 1.3636 [1.3290] 
Self rating Verbal [n = 20] 2.6000 [1.6026] 
Imagery [n = 22] 1.8636 [1.5211] 
 
3.7 Correlating the Two Experimental Tasks 
The ABI scores derived from the 3-way ANOVA (see Section 3.3.2) were entered 
into a Pearson‟s product-moment correlation with participants‟ negative intrusions on the 
breathing focus task, separately for the two groups. No significant correlation was found 
between these measures in either group (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10. Correlations between ABI on the dot probe task and number of negative 
intrusions on the breathing focus task, by Group. 
Group Mean ABI 
[SD] 












 -2.17 p = .358 
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Chapter 4  
Discussion 
4.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter begins with a summary of the current study‟s methodology before 
summarising the main experimental findings. The limitations of the current study are then 
discussed before possible interpretations are advanced for the results that were obtained. 
Findings are also related to those of previous studies. The theoretical implications of the 
current results are then proposed, along with an integrative theory that combines the 
proposed interpretations of these findings with the processes laid out in established models 
of worry. Finally, the clinical implications of the current study are discussed along with 
possible future lines of enquiry. 
4.2 Summary of the Current Study 
This study investigated whether the way in which people tend to worry (i.e., in a 
predominantly verbal way) might maintain the worry process via the generation of 
attentional bias for threat. The dot probe task was used, which had previously revealed 
attentional bias for threat in clinical anxiety and depression. The study also attempted to 
replicate a recent study which had shown that different ways of worrying (verbal and 
imagery-based) give rise to significant differences in negative thought content during a 
breathing focus task. 
All participants in the study were classified as high worriers based on PSWQ 
scores. In the first part of the experiment, participants underwent training to worry in either 
a predominantly verbal or imagery-based way before they worried about a specific worry of 
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theirs in their designated thinking style. Following this first worry phase, participants 
undertook the dot probe task (split into two halves, with a brief middle worry phase in-
between to re-activate worry for the second half of the dot probe task), and then a word 
rating task. In the second part of the experiment, participants worried about a second worry 
of theirs in their designated thinking style before undertaking the breathing focus task. 
Mood Rating Scales were administered repeatedly throughout the study in order to assess 
state mood at various points and Manipulation Check Scales were completed for each 
worry phase. 
4.3 Overview of Findings 
Consistent with hypothesis one, it was found that the Verbal group showed an 
attentional bias for threat on the dot probe task whereas the Imagery group did not, as 
demonstrated by a congruency effect, revealed by a significant three-way Threat Position x 
Probe Position x Group interaction. This difference could not be explained by variation in 
state mood following the first worry phase. However, an alternative measure of attentional 
bias (the Attentional Bias Index; ABI) did not reveal any attentional bias in either group, 
which was not consistent with hypothesis one. 
Contrary to the second hypothesis, the personal relevance of threat words on the dot 
probe task to what participants had worried about during the first and middle worry phases 
did not moderate the aforementioned three-way interaction. Furthermore, the two groups 
were found not to differ on the mean number of words on the word rating task that 
participants had selected as highly relevant to their worries, indicating that the number of 
different topics that the two groups had worried about during the first and middle worry 
phases did not differ. 
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A subsidiary analysis did not show significant attentional bias resulting either from 
enhanced engaging to threat or impaired disengaging from threat. Another subsidiary 
analysis found no evidence for worry giving rise to vigilance to all stimuli in the presence 
of threat, as had been indicated by a previous study. 
Contrary to hypothesis three, no differences were found between the two groups on 
the number of negative intrusions on the breathing focus task following the second worry 
phase. 
In summary, the main hypothesis was supported: Verbal worry leads to significantly 
more attentional bias for threat than imagery-based worry, on one measure of attentional 
bias. Furthermore, this effect cannot be explained by differences in state mood following 
the two types of worry. 
4.4 Methodological Limitations 
The limitations of the current study will now be outlined, followed by a more in-
depth discussion of the possible interpretations of the results. 
4.4.1 Participant characteristics. 
The participants included in the current study were high-worriers and there was no 
requirement of clinical GAD, although some participants might have met diagnostic 
criteria. Further study with clinical participants would be required in order to conclude with 
some confidence that the results of the current study are also applicable to clinical samples. 
Participants were not assessed on current depression other than on the Mood Rating 
Scales. Depression can mask anxiety-related attentional bias (e.g., Bradley et al., 1995); 
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therefore, it would have been more experimentally rigorous to rule out any differential 
effect that depression could have had on attentional bias across the two groups with a 
questionnaire to assess levels of clinical depression, such as the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961). This is unlikely to have been an 
issue in the current study, however, as participants were randomised into experimental 
groups. 
4.4.2 Dot probe task. 
For this study, the dot probe task was chosen as it allowed for the possibility of 
more fine-tuned analyses of attentional bias (e.g., Engaging and Disengaging Indices) than 
many other paradigms. However, it cannot be ignored that the dot probe task has not 
traditionally been a robust measure of content-specific attentional bias (Mogg et al., 1989), 
and was therefore not the best paradigm for looking at how attentional bias is influenced by 
the relevance of words on the dot probe task to what participants had worried about during 
the first and middle worry phases. The modified Stroop task has more consistently revealed 
these effects (Mogg et al.), and future studies interested in investigating this issue might 
benefit from using this task instead. 
4.4.3 Word stimuli. 
The argument of Bradley et al. (1997), that pictorial stimuli are more ecologically 
relevant than word stimuli, speaks to the limited conclusions that can be drawn from the 
current study‟s results regarding attentional bias for everyday threat following verbal 
worry. The rationale for choosing word stimuli on the dot probe task instead of more 
ecological, pictorial stimuli was to better tap certain domains of concern. Hence, the choice 
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of word stimuli represented a favouring of stimulus breadth over both ecological validity 
and threat intensity (as ecological stimuli are known to be more reliably associated with 
attentional bias, see Yiend, 2010). It would be valuable for future studies to investigate the 
properties of attentional bias for more ecological stimuli following different worry 
inductions, although this would necessarily involve limiting the studies‟ ability to 
investigate “content-specificity” of attentional bias, as argued by Mogg and Bradley (1999). 
Despite the intention to represent a breadth of worry domains, many of the words 
used in the dot probe task belonged semantically to more than one worry domain. For 
instance, there was much overlap between words in the Relationship domain and those in 
the Social domain (“shunned” being one example of a word that could belong to both). A 
related issue is that, by not including neutral words in the word rating task, the analyses of 
the effect of word relevance to participants‟ worries on attentional bias for threat were 
limited; although these words were deemed neutral by the experimenter, participants could 
have subjectively appraised some “neutral” words as threatening. Should the study be 
repeated, all words appearing on the dot probe task should be included in the word rating 
task, whether considered neutral or threatening by the experimenter. 
A weaknessof the current study was that Mood Rating Scales were not administered 
immediately prior to the word rating task. This would have permitted an analysis as to 
whether the two groups differed in their state anxiety immediately prior to the word rating 
task, which could help ascertain whether ratings of word relevance were likely to be 
differentially biased by state mood. Furthermore, when doing the word rating task, worry 
might have dissipated to the extent that participants were less able to access the relevance 
of words to their own worries. Although adding an additional worry phase would have been 
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excessive in the current study, the case could be made for future studies looking to replicate 
the findings of the first part of the current study to include a brief worry phase, such as 2 
minutes, to re-activate worry immediately prior to the word rating task. 
4.4.4 Worry training and worry phases. 
The worry training phase occurred prior to the identification of participants‟ 
worries. It is possible that participants from the two groups identified different sorts of 
worry as a result of different training procedures, e.g., worries that were more concrete in 
nature following the imagery worry induction. It would perhaps be better for future studies 
to ask participants to identify two worries prior to entering the worry training phase, in 
order to remove this potential biasing effect. This would also allow for easier stratified 
randomisation of participants to either the Verbal or Imagery group should a difference 
arise between the two groups by chance in terms of the distress and personal relevance 
attached to their identified worries. 
The worry that was induced in the experiment is likely not to exactly mirror more 
ecologically occurring worry. The mere fact that it was induced as opposed to spontaneous 
is one difference. Furthermore, giving participants express permission to worry might 
reduce the degree to which it is aversive, as the responsibility for any negative outcomes 
(cf. Wells‟ Type II meta-beliefs, 1995) might be seen as shared with the experimenter. 
Despite this shortcoming, only worries that were highly personally relevant to participants 
were selected 
Perhaps more importantly, however, the instruction to participants in both groups to 
worry about a specific concern might have encouraged participants to keep the worry more 
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circumscribed and, in this sense, more domain-specific, which could have accounted for the 
same mean number of words across the groups that participants rated as highly relevant to 
what they had worried about during the first and middle worry phases. We might have 
expected the Verbal group to endorse a broader range of threat words as relevant to their 
worry topics, on the basis that verbal worry can be conceptualised as less concrete (Butler, 
1994). 
4.4.5 Assessment of thinking style. 
Although this study was able to analyse the breadth of worry domains that the two 
groups worried about during the first and middle worry phases by comparing the mean 
number words on the worry rating task that the two groups rated as highly relevant to what 
they had worried about, what was not assessed was differential concreteness of the worry 
process during the worry phases. It is likely that the groups differed significantly on the 
concreteness of their worries during the worry phases, in which the Verbal group 
experienced more abstract worry than the Imagery group, characterised by vagueness, as 
has found to be the case in typical pathological, predominantly verbal worry (Butler, 1994). 
Indeed, the verbal worry phases involved merely instructing participants to think in words, 
sentences and questions about their worry with no instruction with regard to worrying about 
specific outcomes, whereas the imagery worry phases involved priming participants‟ 
specific feared outcomes as well as encouraging participants to situate their mental images 
in space and time and to experience the worry “as thought it were happening now”. 
Concreteness is an important concept as it relates to Stöber‟s reduced concreteness theory 
of worry (1998), in which the abstractness of the worry process leads to the generation of 
vague images, which leads to a reduction of physiological reactivity that serves to maintain 
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the abstract worry process by negative reinforcement. However, without measuring 
concreteness of thought, it is not possible to know whether the two groups differed in this 
respect.  
Should similar studies be conducted in future, it would be beneficial to include 
questionnaires that would allow for a group comparison on concreteness of thinking during 
worry phases, in order to help determine whether concreteness partially mediates the effect 
of different worry inductions on attentional bias. For the Verbal group, this might have 
been achieved by asking participants to rate on a VAS the extent to which they were 
worrying about outcomes that were specific (from “extremely vague” to “extremely 
specific”). For the Imagery group, concreteness of imagery could also have been assessed 
by means of a similar VAS, by asking participants to rate the quality of their mental images 
during the worry phases (from “extremely vague” to “extremely vivid”), with the rationale 
that vividness of imagery is an analogue for concreteness of processing as it would be 
unlikely that participants could generate a vivid image about a vague outcome. 
4.5 Interpretation of Findings 
4.5.1 Hypothesis one. 
The fact that a three-way interaction effect of Threat Position x Probe Position x 
Group was found, in which a two-way interaction effect between Threat Position and Probe 
Position was confined to the Verbal group, provides support for the primary hypothesis of 
the study, i.e., that verbal worry leads to a stronger attentional bias for threat than imagery-
based worry. The nature of this two-way interaction in the Verbal group was that Threat 
Position moderated the main effect of Probe Position, in which the degree to which RTs to 
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probes which appeared in the top location were speeded was lessened when the threat word 
appeared in the Bottom (incongruent) position than when it appeared in the Top 
(congruent) position. The main effect of Probe Position that was found in the current study 
was also found following the worry induction of Oathes et al. (2010), and has also been 
found in studies of anxiety-induced attentional bias (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Keogh, 
Dillon, Georgiou & Hunt, 2001). According to Cohen (1988), effect size (η²) can be 
categorised as small (0.01), medium (0.059) and large (0.138). The effect size of the three-
way interaction obtained in this study (η² = 0.097) is therefore in the medium range. ABI 
analyses clarified this 3-way interaction effect: The Verbal group showed significantly 
faster RTs to threat vs neutral words compared to a baseline of 0, whereas the Imagery 
group did not. Furthermore, there was found to be significantly more speeding of RTs to 
threat words in the Verbal group than in the Imagery group. 
In order to explore a possible reason for the three-way interaction found in the 
current study, an analysis was conducted comparing each group‟s anxiety, depression and 
happiness scores on the Mood Rating Scales administered after the first worry phase. There 
were no differences between the groups on either of these measures following the first 
worry phase, which indicates that the differential effect of Threat Position on Probe 
Position by Group on the dot probe task did not arise due to different effects of verbal and 
imagery-based worry induction on participants‟ state mood. 
One might argue that the results of the current study did not reflect a true attentional 
bias for threat, but that, similarly to the argument of Bradley et al. (1997) (see Section 
1.11.2), verbal worry merely primed certain words and facilitated RTs to those same words, 
rather than generating an attentional bias for threat resulting from a more general priming 
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of all threat-related mental representations; however, the lack of a Relevance x Group 
interaction does not support this, as one would expect the words to be deemed highly 
relevant to one‟s worry to be the more likely to be primed and therefore to show a greater 
speeding of RTs in the Verbal group than the Imagery group. To further investigate this 
possibility, researchers might repeat this study by using pictorial stimuli, which would 
remove the likelihood of verbal worry priming specific words. 
4.5.2 Hypothesis two. 
The analysis of personal relevance of words on the dot probe task to what 
participants worried about during the first worry phase provided further information as to 
the nature of the three-way interaction effect. Relevance was added as a third within-
subjects factor in the ANOVA and no significant four-way Relevance x Threat Position x 
Probe Position x Group interaction was obtained. This four-way interaction was non-
significant for each of the three ways in which it was performed, twice for measures of 
relevance based on participants‟ ratings on the word rating task and once for a measure of 
relevance based on participants‟ responses on the WDQ. This lack of a four-way interaction 
is contrary to hypothesis two, which would predict a significant four-way interaction in 
which Relevance moderates the significant three-way interaction (Threat Position x Probe 
Position x Group interaction). However, the lack of a significant four-way interaction 
suggests that not only does attentional bias operate toward general threat (i.e., 
independently of the relatedness of threat-words to worry content), but that imagery-based 
worry does not give rise to attentional bias even toward threat-words that are highly related 
to worry content. What mechanism could give rise to a relatively indiscriminate bias for 
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threat after verbal worry, and how might imagery-based worry be protective against any 
attentional bias for threat? 
The model of Holmes and Mathews (2010), in which imagery-based processing 
entails some overlap with actual perception of events, allows for imaginal exposure to take 
place. Can the attentional bias differences between the groups of the current study be 
explained by different levels of imaginal exposure? It is possible that a habituation process 
took place during imagery-based worry in the Imagery group, which somehow gave rise to 
less of an attentional bias than the Verbal group, in which the cognitive avoidance provided 
by verbal worry (according to the cognitive avoidance hypothesis of Borkovec et al., 2004) 
impaired the exposure process to relevant words. Indeed, exposure therapy has been known 
to reduce attentional bias for threat (e.g., Watts, Trezise & Sharrock, 1986; Lavy, van den 
Hout & Arntz, 1993). However, the analyses showed no significant difference in the two 
groups‟ anxiety following the first worry phase, which is not in keeping with the idea of 
more habituation having taken place in the Imagery group, as one would expect a 
concomitant reduction in anxiety if this had been the case. 
Holmes and Mathews (2010) speculated on additional mechanisms via which 
imagery might be beneficial over verbal processing. One possibility mentioned by these 
authors is that the individual exposed to imagery might come to appreciate the difference 
between imagery and immediate, real-world perceived stimuli. While this could have been 
the case in the current study, it is doubtful that a 6 minute exposure period would be 
sufficient to instill this realisation in those who were in the Imagery group. Furthermore, 
the lack of a difference in anxiety between the groups is not suggestive of such a process 
having taken place to any great extent in the Imagery group. These authors also suggested 
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that image rescripting could be a mechanism via which imagery-based processing could be 
beneficial. In the current study, it is possible that training some participants to imagine their 
worries could encourage this process to occur naturally, in which staying with an image 
naturally allows more room for benign imagery, e.g., of a less severe outcome; however, 
again the lack of difference in anxiety levels of the two groups does not suggest that those 
in the Imagery group were significantly more likely to happen upon a more benign outcome 
for their worry topics during the first worry phase. 
Goldman, Dugas, Sexton and Gervais (2007) noted that imaginal exposure might 
derive effectiveness both by addressing cognitive avoidance (i.e., encouraging habituation 
to take place) as well as by tackling intolerance of uncertainty through the generation of 
mental images that are concrete and engender more of a sense of certainty. However, while 
imagery-based worry might give rise to a higher sense of certainty than verbal worry, it is 
difficult to think of a plausible mechanism via which levels of uncertainty might affect 
attentional bias for threat. 
The theory of Hirsch and Mathews (submitted) mentioned in the introduction, i.e., 
of verbal worry engendering a general threat-detection mechanism, seems a better 
explanation of the findings of the current study. According to this theory, by worrying in a 
predominantly verbal way, the Verbal group triggered a “general threat detection 
mechanism”. This hypothesis explains the three-way interaction obtained in the study as 
well as the fact that the groups did not differ on state anxiety. It is also consistent with the 
fact that this three-way interaction was not moderated by the relevance of words on the dot 
probe task to participants‟ particular worries (i.e., the lack of a four-way interaction effect, 
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see Section 4.5.2). If this “general threat detection” mechanism was activated in the Verbal 
group, what triggered it? 
One trigger might have been a group difference in the number of topics worried 
about during the first worry phase. One might expect the Verbal group to have jumped 
more from topic to topic, covering a wide range of worry domains, as this is what is 
observed in pathological worriers (Butler, 1994). Worrying purely in images is not 
commonplace (Borkovec & Inz, 1990), hence it is unlikely that participants in the Imagery 
group will have been as able to jump from topic to topic. It is possible, then, that the Verbal 
group activated many different worry domains by moving in-between worry topics and, in 
doing so, activated an attentional bias more generally to words covering multiple domains 
of worry. However, this seems unlikely given that the two groups did not differ on the 
mean number of words they deemed highly relevant to what they had worried about in the 
first and middle worry phases. What this suggests, on the contrary, is that participants in 
both groups thought about an equal spread of topics during the first worry phase. It would 
be interesting for future studies to experimentally manipulate the spread of worry topics 
that participants worry about, by randomising participants into two groups: One that is 
instructed to worry about one specific topic during the worry phase and one that is 
instructed to jump from topic to topic. The two groups could then be compared on 
attentional bias for threat, to see whether worrying about many topics over many worry 
domains generates more of an attentional bias for threat than worrying about a single topic 
within a single worry domain. 
Another possibility is that, as discussed in Section 4.4.5, the groups differed 
significantly on the concreteness of their worries during the worry phases. It would be 
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expected for the Verbal group to have experienced more abstract worry (Butler, 1994), 
characterised by worrying about vague outcomes. Some of the downsides of abstract verbal 
processing have already been discussed by other theorists. For example, Stöber‟s reduced 
concreteness theory of worry (1998) proposed that it is the inherent vagueness of verbal 
worry that imbues it with its physiologically-dampening effect (e.g., Borkovec & Hu, 
1990), leading to the reinforcement of the worry process. Watkins (2008) discussed the 
emotional costs of repetitive thinking characterised by processes such as worry. In light of 
the results of the current study, it is proposed that the vague, abstract nature of verbal worry 
might additionally trigger the “general threat detection mechanism” of Hirsch and Mathews 
(submitted). The possibility that worrying could influence the attentional system is in line 
with the combined cognitive bias hypothesis of Hirsch et al. (2006), in which a bias in one 
cognitive domain can trigger a bias in the same direction in another domain of processing. 
In the current study, it is possible that a bias for abstract (verbal) thought triggers a bias in 
attention that is also abstract (i.e., not specific to any one type of threatening stimulus). This 
could be tested in more detail in future studies by looking more closely at the properties of 
verbal worry that give rise to attentional bias, by inducing verbal and imagery-based worry 
in both a concrete and abstract form (cf. Watkins & Moulds, 2005, who experimentally 
induced concrete/abstract ruminative self-focus and found concrete self-focus of a verbal 
nature to improve social problem solving in depressed patients relative to abstract self-
focus). 
4.5.3 Subsidiary analyses. 
There was no main effect of Trial Type, no Trial Type x Group interaction and no 
three-way Probe Position x Trial Type x Group interaction, contrary to what had been 
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found by Oathes et al. (2010). Hence, the current study does not support the notion of 
verbal worry giving rise to a general vigilance effect. However, this could be due to many 
differences between the current study and that of Oathes et al. (see Section 4.6.1). There 
was not found to be any significant effect of engaging/disengaging as a result of Verbal 
worry in an analysis of ABI scores, which is perhaps surprising given the evidence for 
attentional bias for threat in the Verbal group in the three-way interaction effect and the 
subsequent ABI analysis (see Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). However, this could be an artefact 
of using different methods for calculating ABI scores (see Footnote 4). 
4.5.4 Hypothesis three. 
The breathing focus task did not reveal any differential effect of worrying in a 
verbal or imagery-based way on negative thought intrusions, either on the self-rated or 
independently-rated analyses. This is contrary to the findings of Stokes and Hirsch (2010). 
Therefore, the results of this study did not support hypothesis three. Furthermore, there was 
not found to be a correlation between the number of negative intrusions (which the current 
study considers to be a measure of attentional bias for threat) on the breathing focus task 
and attentional bias for threat on the dot probe task, which might be taken to indicate that, 
although attentional bias for threat was evident in the Verbal group on the dot probe task 
(see Section 3.3.1), attentional bias as measured by the breathing focus task was not 
evident. Nonetheless, it is possible that the lack of a significant finding on the breathing 
focus task is an artefact of the study‟s methodology rather than being indicative of a lack of 
a real difference between the effects of verbal and imagery-based worry on the breathing 
focus task.  
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The breathing focus task was near the very end of the study, by which point most 
participants were noticeably fatigued, and many reported that this was the case. Indeed, 
“tired” was a common thought intrusion to occur in the breathing focus task. Secondly, 
there was no re-training process before participants entered the second worry phase, which 
might have led to fewer differences between the groups on thinking style during this worry 
phase. To support this interpretation, the Verbal group was found to be significantly less 
adherent to worrying in a verbal way in the last 2 minutes of the second worry phase 
(before the breathing focus task) compared with the last 2 minutes of the first worry phase 
(before the dot probe task). Thirdly, analyses indicated that the Imagery group experienced 
significantly less anxiety during the second worry phase, which immediately preceded the 
breathing focus task, than the first worry phase, which might have been due to fatigue. 
Finally, a lack of a pre/post comparison on the breathing focus task reduces the sensitivity 
of the task as it relied fully on between-subject effects rather than the additional factor of 
within-subject change. In this study it was a warranted design as it was done to reduce the 
length of the study and fatigue effects; however, future studies attempting to replicate 
Stokes and Hirsch‟s (2010) study should ideally adhere more closely to these authors‟ 
original methodology. 
4.6 Theoretical Implications 
The results of the current study are supportive of the notion of a “general threat 
detection mechanism” (Hirsch & Mathews, submitted), in which worry in its common, 
predominantly verbal, form generates an attentional bias for all sorts of threat stimuli. It 
seems likely that this attentional bias would increase the density of stimuli in the person‟s 
environment that could trigger a worry episode.  
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The attentional bias in the current study was found to occur at 200 ms, an SOA 
which is within the “initial orienting” period of attentional allocation, according to Mogg 
and Bradley (2006), which is analogous to an earlier, more automatic stage of attentional 
processing (although there is no consensus as yet regarding specific SOAs at which 
“automatic” becomes “strategic”). This is in keeping with dot probe tasks that have 
previously demonstrated similar attentional biases at similar SOAs in clinical anxiety, as 
demonstrated initially by MacLeod et al. (1986). To link these results in with the model of 
Williams et al. (1988, 1997), negative and abstract verbal thought gives rise to attentional 
bias for threat at the “priming” stage. 
The relative automaticity of this process is likely to make it harder to control; even 
if attentional bias for threat could be consciously overridden, as proposed by the model of 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), its insidious nature would make it difficult to recognise 
its operation in the first place. It is possible that there is a link between the fact that worry-
induced attentional bias in high-worriers happens at a stage in processing that would make 
it difficult to control, and the results of Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) showing that worry is 
perceived as less controllable with increasing degrees of worry severity (i.e., from non-
anxious controls, to non-GAD high worriers, to people with GAD). For example, it might 
be that degree of controllability of attentional bias following verbal worry somehow leads 
to differences in perceived worry controllability. 
4.6.1 The approach-avoidance theory of GAD. 
The approach-avoidance theory of GAD is found in Figure 5, which is a 
combination of the cognitive avoidance hypothesis (Borkovec et al., 2004) with the 
speculated account of the current study‟s findings. This integrative theory is found within 
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the dotted box, along with a proposed mechanism via which attentional bias leads to 
aversive mental imagery (“4. Bottom-up triggering” – cf. the model of Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). Processes represented by the models of Wells (1995) and Dugas et al. (1998) are 
found outside the dotted box, and the theory proposes that the relatively uncontrollable 
aversive mental imagery resulting partially from an automatic attentional bias contributes to 
meta-beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry. 
This integrative theory posits the operation of two interactive cognitive mechanisms 
in the maintenance of worry in GAD: One being cognitive avoidance, the other being 
cognitive approach. First let us consider the cognitive avoidance function. 
The vicious cycle presented in Figure 5 can be said to begin at the box labelled 
“Start: Aversive mental imagery”, which represents the aversive mental imagery that is key 
in the cognitive avoidance hypothesis of Borkovec et al. (2004). According to Borkovec et 
al., mental imagery then leads to verbal worry, which functions to suppress (i.e., 
cognitively avoid) this mental imagery (represented by the arrow labelled “1. Avoid” 
leading to the box labelled “Verbal worry”). What results is an interference with the 
processing of the aversive mental imagery (the “fear structures”; Foa and Kozak, 1986) that 
began the cycle, which maintains the imagery. This is represented by the arrow labelled “2. 
Interfere with processing” leading back into the first box: “Start: Aversive mental 
imagery”.  
What is additionally proposed in the approach-avoidance theory, based on 
speculative interpretations of the current study‟s results, is the operation of a secondary 
cognitive approach function, in which a “general threat detection mechanism” is triggered 
by predominantly verbal worry (arrow “3. Approach”), which then leads to a higher 
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instance of bottom-up triggering of imagery (arrow 4. “Bottom-up triggering”) as a wider 
range of more threatening-stimuli come to be noticed in the environment. This “bottom-up 
triggering” is based on Holmes and Mathews‟ (2010) model, which proposes that sensory 
cues lead to the generation of emotional images via the accessing of memory stores. In the 
proposed approach-avoidance theory of GAD, the very mental images that verbal worry 
functions to suppress are contained within autobiographical and semantic memory stores, in 
the way that Foa and Kozak (1986) originally proposed their “fear structures” to be 
memory-based representations. Once these “fear structures” are activated, verbal imagery is 
then recruited to suppress the imagery and its associated affect, thereby completing the 
cycle. It would also be expected that verbal material would be activated along with mental 
imagery, but this theory focuses on imagery as it is central to the cognitive avoidance 
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While the current study provides support for the “3. Approach” arrow of Figure 5, it 
only does so for high-worriers who are not necessarily clinically impaired by worry. In 
Figure 5, attentional bias leads directly to aversive imagery via “3. Bottom-up triggering”. 
Whether attentional bias for threat does trigger aversive mental imagery could be tested in 
future studies by inducing attentional bias for threat (cf. the study of Krebs, Hirsch & 
Automatic attentional 
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Mathews, 2010), with participants keeping a diary of aversive mental imagery in the time 
period immediately following the attentional bias induction (e.g., for one hour), and then 
comparing these participants with those who receive a benign attentional bias induction. 
That the study of Oathes et al. (2010) did not find worrying to give rise to a Threat 
Position x Probe Position interaction merits some consideration. First of all, in their study, 
participants were not trained to worry in a particular way and could therefore have been 
experiencing more mental imagery than participants in the Verbal group of the current 
study. Secondly, these authors recruited participants scoring in the “low normal range” on 
the PSWQ, and it could be that attentional bias differentially affects low- and high-
worriers, much in the way that working memory is differentially depleted during worry in 
low- and high-worriers (Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2008). A replication of the first half of 
the current study with low worriers could help to clarify whether more pure verbal worry 
generates attentional bias for threat irrespective of worry status, or whether attentional bias 
is only triggered in high-worriers. This replication could also help clarify whether different 
SOAs can account for the different findings of the current study and that of Oathes et al., as 
it might be that attentional bias might have been operating at a more “automatic” stage of 
attention, which might not be detected at the SOA of 500 ms used by these authors. 
4.7 Clinical Implications and Future Avenues for Research 
While it would be premature to make clinical recommendations on the basis of 
results of the current study, which did not specifically recruit a clinical population, the 
absence of attentional bias in imagery-based worry is in support of the use of imagery-
based techniques in therapy. CBT is the first-line treatment for GAD (National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence; NICE, 2004) and numerous CBT treatment protocols 
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recommend the inclusion of imagery exposure. For example, Borkovec et al. (2004) 
recommend the inclusion of imagery exposure in the treatment of GAD. 
What cannot be recommended is the type of imagery that might be most helpful. As 
mentioned in Section 4.4.5, the crucial properties of the imagery-based worry that protected 
participants in the current study from attentional bias for threat are not known, and future 
possible lines of enquiry were suggested that would help to pick out what might be the 
most beneficial aspect of imagery-based processing. In particular, future studies would 
need to include clinical populations in order to make any firm recommendations about how 
to apply imagery-based techniques in therapy. 
The effects of worry on attentional bias across disorders would be interesting to 
investigate, as research has suggested that worry is a transdiagnostic process that concerns 
disorder-specific material (e.g., Ehring & Watkins, 2008). Conceptualising worry more 
broadly under the rubric of “repetitive negative thinking” (Watkins, 2008) allows us to 
consider the possibility that attentional bias might result from other types of verbal, abstract 
processes, such as rumination and obsession. 
Much like previous research has looked at how biases in one cognitive domain can 
produce congruent biases in other domains (e.g., Hertel et al., 2003), there are many 
interesting avenues remaining to be explored. The link between attentional bias and 
working memory capacity is one, as it is possible that the generation of attentional bias 
might be partially responsible for depleted working memory during worry (e.g., Hayes, 
Hirsch & Mathews, 2008). 
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While the current study did provide some support for attentional bias for threat in 
worry, the components of attention that were affected could not be determined. Future 
studies might clarify this, which would help to fine-tune theories of worry-induced 
attentional bias. 
4.8 Summary 
There have been many theories to account for the maintenance of worry in GAD. 
The current study explored the possibility that verbal worry might engender more of an 
attentional bias for threat than imagery-based worry, and provided support for this. 
Furthermore, the finding of attentional bias for threat following verbal but not imagery-
based worry could not be accounted for by state mood differences between the two 
experimental groups. It is proposed that verbal worry generates a “general threat detection 
mechanism” (Hirsch & Mathews, submitted), which maintains the worry process by 
increasing the number of threatening stimuli that are noticed in one‟s environment,thereby 
triggering aversive mental imagery, which is unhelpfully dealt with in turn by verbal worry, 
as per the cognitive avoidance hypothesis (Borkovec et al., 2004). Although the results do 
not warrant any strong conclusions regarding the existence of attentional bias following 
worry in clinical samples, they support of the use of imagery-based techniques in therapy. It 
would be valuable if the methodology of the first part of the current study were to be 
repeated with a clinical sample.  
Some future lines of investigation are proposed in order to clarify the important 
aspects of verbal worry that might generate the attentional bias found in the current study, 
such as experimentally manipulating levels of concreteness of worry. It is also proposed 
that worry-induced attentional bias could be investigated transdiagnostically, that the 
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interaction between worry-induced attentional bias and working memory might be explored 
and that the components of attention affected by worry-induced worry should be 
investigated.
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Appendix 1  
Information Sheet 
PNM/10/11-71 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION 
SHEET 
What is the link between attention and worry? 
We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. You 
should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you 
in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
The principal aim of this research is to explore the link between how people worry 
and how this affects their attention to threatening information in the environment. A better 
understanding of this will inform the treatment of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). The 
primary feature of GAD is uncontrollable worry. 
This study will recruit students studying at King‟s College London, College staff 
and members of the public, who are determined by a screening questionnaire to be suitable 
(see next paragraph). Participants will only be included if they speak English as a first 
language. 
If you agree to take part after reading this information sheet, you will be asked to 
complete and return the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. If you meet our criteria you will 
be asked to take part in the study. If you agree to take part, we will invite you to attend an 
experimental session within 2 weeks. This session will last approximately 1 ¾ hours, 
although please be advised that it can last up to 2 hours. The session will entail first of all 
completing 4 more questionnaires, which will ask you about levels of anxiety, depression 
and worry. 
Following these questionnaires, you will then be briefly trained to complete a 
straightforward computer task which involves responding to symbols appearing on the 
screen after 2 words. Then you will be trained to worry in a certain way, and will be asked 
to identify 2 current worries of yours (that you feel comfortable sharing with the 
researcher), before going on to think about one of those worries in the particular way that 
you were trained, for 6 minutes, with regular breaks in between. After this, you will 
complete the computer task on which you were trained, before completing another 
computer task which involves rating some words. Then you will be trained to focus on your 
breathing in a certain way, before being asked to think about the second worry you 
identified in the same way as before for 6 minutes, with regular breaks in between. Then 
you will go on to focus on your breathing for 5 minutes, as practiced. In the task in which 
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you focus on your breathing you will be asked to report briefly on where your mind 
wanders to and, later, to elaborate somewhat on the contents of your thoughts. 
At the end of the session, you will be debriefed about the study in some more detail, 
and this will be a chance for you to discuss with the experimenter how you found the 
experiment. 
In terms of risks, the study involves thinking about two current worries of your 
own. Some people might find this task uncomfortable or mildly distressing, but that feeling 
will go away once the task stops and will have no long-term impact. Furthermore, although 
unlikely, the questionnaires relating to your mood and worry may cause slight distress. It is 
also possible that being presented with words on a computer screen, some of which you 
might find negative, could be slightly distressing, but again this feeling will go away once 
the task stops and will have no long-term impact. Finally, it may be slightly distressing to 
report the contents of the thoughts that may arise during the task in which you focus on 
your breathing. Any discomfort/distress arising from any of these tasks will be met with 
empathy and support. If the tasks bring up any concerns, you will have the opportunity to 
discuss them with the experimenter. 
If you‟d like to have a written report of the main project please let the main 
researcher (Marc Williams) know, in which case we can keep your contact details, such as 
your email address, in a completely separate database from your data so that we can send 
you the final report. Furthermore, there will be an opportunity for you to discuss any 
concerns resulting from the experiment with me or another member of the research team if 
appropriate. 
All information will be kept strictly confidential unless any information is disclosed 
which could seriously affect the welfare of yourself or others, in which case a third party 
may have to be contacted for legal reasons. You will be given an identification number 
which will be attached to your data instead of your name. These data will be kept in a 
secure database on a password protected computer, a locked filing cabinet, or a secure data 
storage facility, only to be seen by members of the research team. 
Information about your age and sex will be kept in a separate database, so that we 
can report the demographics of our participants as a whole in the final report. These two 
databases will be kept for 5 years post-publication, in an anonymised form, as this is a 
requirement of academic psychology journals. 
With your consent, parts of the session will be audio-taped for later categorisation 
by a member of the research team. These digital recordings will be stored securely on a 
password protected computer for up to 5 years post-publication of the data – again, this is a 
requirement of academic psychology journals. They will be stored with only your 
participant number and no other personal identifying information will be attached. In 
addition, with your consent, anonymised extracts may be used in resulting publications. 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign two copies of the consent 
form, one of which you will keep. You will be reimbursed £15 for time and travel.  
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If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason. If you withdraw from the study after completing the experimental session 
but prior to data analysis taking place, please let us know and your data will be removed 
from our database, and none of it will be analysed. 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King‟s College London 
using the details below for further advice and information‟. 
Marc Williams 
Addiction Sciences Building 3rd Floor 
Institute of Psychiatry 
King's College London 
4 Windsor Walk 
London SE5 8AF 
Tel: 07964868347 Email: marc.williams@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Dr Colette Hirsch 
PO 77 
Room P1.06 
King's College London, Institute of Psychiatry 
De Crespigny Park 
London SE5 8AF 
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CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened 
to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: What is the link between attention and worry? 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: PNM/10/11-71 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain 
the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the Information 
Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. 




 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving any reason and without my legal rights being affected. Furthermore, I understand that I will 
only be able to withdraw my data up to the point of data analysis. 
 
  I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
 
 I agree to parts of the session being audio-taped and to the anonymised recordings being 
categorised by 2 members of the research team. 
 
 I understand that all my data from the experimental sessions, including audio recordings, will be 
anonymised and stored securely along with the rest of my anonymised data on a password protected 
computer, a locked filing cabinet, or a secure data storage facility for up to 5 years post-publication 
of the data. 
 
 I agree to the possible use of anonymous extracts from audio data to be used in publications. 
 
 
 The information I submit will be published as a report and I will be sent a copy if I request this. I 
understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to 
identify me from any publications. 
 
 I consent to a third party being contacted in the event of disclosing any information that could 






























agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet 
about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 






Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 
Signed                                          Date 
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Appendix 3 
Word Pairs for the Dot Probe Task (First Half) 
Threat   Neutral Domain 
Lonely Camper Relationships 
Ugly Jeep Relationships 
Shunned Oatmeal Relationships 
Breakup Agility Relationships 
Unloved Balcony Relationships 
Coward Advent Lack of confidence 
Criticised Digestible Lack of confidence 
Wimp Plug Lack of confidence 
Stupid Window Lack of confidence 
Insecure Farmyard Lack of confidence 
Useless Sunrise Aimless future 
Failure Overall Aimless future 
Unemployed Waitresses Aimless future 
Aimless Carpets Aimless future 
Absentminded Handkerchief Aimless future 
Late Navy Work incompetence 
Incapable Cosmology Work incompetence 
Incompetence Constituents Work incompetence 
Lazy Clam Work incompetence 
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Appendix 3 contd 
Word Pairs for the Dot Probe Practice Task (Second Half)  
Threat         Neutral Domain 
Bankrupt Midpoint Financial 
Hardship Profiles Financial 
Debt Lace Financial 
Poverty Cordial Financial 
Bills Twirl Financial 
Starvation Celebrates Socio-political 
Abuse Poise Socio-political 
Landfill Railways Socio-political 
Torture Bourbon Socio-political 
Cruelty Neptune Socio-political 
Agony Dials Physical 
Cancer Idioms Physical 
Choking Croquet Physical 
Crippled Acrobats Physical 
Assault Airmail Physical 
Worthless Recalling Social 
Inferior Proposes Social 
Boring Spires Social 
Humiliated Embankment Social 
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Appendix 4 











Not at all                    Extremely 









Not at all                    Extremely 









Not at all          Extremely 
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Appendix 4 contd 



































2. Please indicate how distressed you are about your worry topic: 
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Appendix 5 










   (1) How much of your mental activity was in Images? 
 
 
        0   Not at all in images         100   In images all the time 
 
 











        0   Not at all in words,  sentences        100   In words,  sentences and 
             and questions                                                       questions all the time 
 
 






























   (1) How much of your mental activity was in Images? 
 
 
        0   Not at all in images         100   In images all the time 
 
 











        0   Not at all in words,  sentences        100   In words,  sentences and 
             and questions                                                       questions all the time 
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Appendix 6 contd 
Scenario Scales (Second Page) 




- Negative           _____ 
 
 
- Neutral              _____ 
 
 
- Positive             _____ 
 
 










(4). Please rate how often you have worried about a situation like this over the past 
few weeks (please circle) -: 
 
 
0      1                        2                         3                    4 
 
Not          Almost           Sometimes               Often                  Very                                                                       
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Not at all 
Totally 
Not at all 
Totally 
Not at all 
Totally 
Not at all 
Totally 
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Appendix 8 



















  (1) During those 2 minutes focused on your worry topic, how much of your mental activity     
        was in images? 
 
 
        0   Not at all in images         100   In images all the time 
 
 
         …………………… 





  (2) During those 2 minutes focused on your worry topic, how much of your mental  
        activity was in words, sentences and questions? 
 
        0   Not at all in  words,  sentences        100   In words,  sentences and 
             and questions                                                       questions all the time 
 
 






(3) What % of the time when you were thinking about your worry topic were your  
     thoughts/images:- 
 
 
- Negative         _____ 
 
- Neutral            _____ 
 
- Positive           _____ 
 
                                                   = 100% 
      
  129 
 
Appendix 9 
Repetition of Analyses after Removing Extreme Outliers 
The congruency effect (see Section 3.3.1) was re-analysed after excluding the 
extreme outliers and all main effects and interaction effects retained significance (Probe 
Position: F(1, 46) = 88.283,  p < .001, η² = .657; Probe Position x Group: F(1, 46), p = 
.029, η² = .100; Threat Position x Probe Position x Group: F(1, 46), p = .029, η² = .099). 
The two repeated measures ANOVAS conducted separately on the Verbal and 
Imagery group (see Section 3.3.1) were repeated after removing the two extreme outliers in 
the Imagery group. The same pattern was found: No Threat Position x Probe Position 
interaction in the Imagery group (F(1, 22) = 1.120, p = .301, η² = .048) but a main effect of 
Probe Position was found (F(1, 22) = 117.984, p < .001, η² = .843); a main effect of Probe 
Position for the Verbal group (F(1, 24) = 18.841, p < .001, η² = .440) as well as a 
significant Threat Position x Probe Position interaction (F = 4.275, p = .050, η² = .151). 
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1.1 Abstract 
There is some indication in the literature that psychotherapeutic treatment outcomes 
vary according to service user ethnicity, although this is by no means a consistent finding. 
This has important implications for the fair treatment of service users from culturally 
diverse backgrounds. The aim of this study was to investigate service user treatment 
response by ethnicity in the Southwark IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies) service by comparing service users of different ethnic groups on their response 
to treatment as indicated by changes in depressive and anxious symptomatology. The 
results of this study do not indicate differential treatment response by ethnicity between 
three main ethnic groups: 1. White British; 2. Any Other White Background; 3. Black or 
Black British. This finding is discussed in terms of how well Southwark IAPT may be 
doing to enhance the acceptability and accessibility of its services to Black and Minority 
Ethnic (BME) groups but also in terms of methodological issues potentially obscuring a 
difference in treatment outcomes by ethnicity that might exist. Some means of improving 
the way in which service user ethnicity is monitored are discussed. A subsidiary 
representativeness analysis confirms previous findings in the literature of an 
underrepresentation of Black and Black British service users in primary care settings. The 
discussion explores ways in which Southwark IAPT could continue to improve its 
acceptability and accessibility to BME groups. 
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1.2 Background 
In attempting to ensure a fair distribution of mental health services in society, 
categorising people becomes necessary. Race is one classification system, which is based 
on a putative genetic distinction between groups of different geographical origins; however, 
this term has become increasingly otiose within academia for a variety of reasons. For 
example, there has been widespread interbreeding of peoples of different geographical 
origins over the course of history (e.g., as Spickard [1992] illustrates in the case of modern 
America), an observation that calls into question any group distinction based on genetic 
inheritance.  
Ethnicity might be a more meaningful term, which Weber (1922) defined as a belief 
in a common descent “because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or 
because of memories of colonization and migration”. Weber also included in his definition 
that an “objective blood relationship” between people in the group was not necessary for 
their membership; therefore, this term includes the biological notion of race as well as that 
of cultural similarity, e.g., similar beliefs, languages and attitudes. Categorising people in 
this way allows us to hold in mind the differences that we observe between people while 
appreciating that the differences that are considered meaningful and the categories we apply 
based on these differences are subjective. The term ethnicity, however, also has many of 
the shortcomings of race, as noted by Kaplan and Bennett (2003), such as the fact that some 
individuals see themselves as affiliated with multiple groups. These authors have therefore 
laid out a set of suggested guidelines when using these terms in order to maximise their 
meaningfulness. 
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 Why should there be an expectation of ethnic differences in response to 
psychological treatments? Robertson (2010) argues that the principles of cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT), in which cognitions (thought content) are given primary 
importance in determining behavioural and affective responses to events, can be traced 
back to Socratic philosophy, Roman Stoicism in particular. One notable parallel that 
Robertson draws between CBT and ancient philosophy is the Socratic method of subjecting 
one‟s thoughts and interpretations to rational scrutiny. Furthermore, Epictetus, a Greek 
Stoic philosopher, is credited with the saying: “It's not what happens to you, but how you 
react to it that matters” – which could be said to mirror the nub of the cognitive-behavioural 
model of mental illness, i.e., that our interpretations of events determine our emotional 
reactions and not the events themselves. Albert Ellis, who created Rational Emotive 
Therapy (RET - a precursor to CBT), had also noted the Greek and Roman Stoic roots of 
RET and, additionally, how the principles of RET could be found in the statements of some 
of the ancient Taoist and Buddhist thinkers (Ellis, 1962). Therefore, cultural background 
could influence levels of exposure to the principles of CBT prior to therapy and, in turn, 
engagement/success in treatment.  
Furthermore, mental health treatments for adults are overwhelmingly clinic-based 
and dyadic, informed by the notion that a mental illness is located within the individual. 
Watters (2001) discussed the mental health care of refugees from abroad and observed that 
many refugees presenting at mental health services might have a different “explanatory 
model” of their problems, such as seeing them in terms of external “social, political and 
economic” circumstances, as opposed to an “illness” located inside them. Both 
“explanatory models” of mental illness – the internal and the external – offer a valid 
perspective and could be seen simply as different levels of explanation. Nonetheless, until it 
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is shown that ethnic minorities are more likely to show a different explanatory model than 
British groups under a similar circumstance (such as that of refugee being a refugee), we 
cannot conclude that this is due to ethnicity as opposed to differences in circumstance. 
Another pertinent cultural difference when considering differential treatment 
outcomes relates to the characteristic of being a collectivist or an individualistic culture 
(Hofstede, 1984). An individualistic society places high value on independence from 
others, in which one takes care of oneself and one‟s immediate family. A collectivist 
society consists of groups, such as extended families, in which members are loyal to one 
another and mutually dependent. Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) provided 
evidence, for instance, that European Americans are, on average, of a relatively 
individualistic mindset (“valuing personal independence”) and are less collectivistic 
(“feeling duty to in-groups”) compared with this study‟s Chinese sample, which showed the 
opposite pattern. In view of this, some ethnic minorities may benefit more from therapeutic 
approaches with a philosophy that is more aligned to this collectivist perspective, such as 
family therapy or community psychology, which view the individual‟s mental illness as 
located at least partly within the system, such as the family or the wider community, in 
which they find themselves. It could be argued that CBT would best be categorised as a 
therapy tailored to an individualistic perspective, locating the disorder and the locus for 
change within the individual, which could make it a less appropriate treatment for those 
holding a more collectivist perspective. 
There are factors more incidentally related to belonging to a minority ethnic group 
that could impinge on treatment success. One likely detractor from therapeutic benefit is 
degree of fluency in the therapist‟s language, which would be especially likely for those 
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people who emigrated more recently from their country of origin. Other factors related 
indirectly to ethnicity are level of education and socioeconomic status, which could 
interfere with treatment success in various ways, e.g., via increased financial stressors and 
lower levels of reading ability. 
Now that we have considered theoretical reasons why there might exist differential 
treatment response between ethnicities, let us consider the evidence to date on this matter. 
The first study to suggest an interaction between ethnicity and psychotherapeutic outcome 
was conducted by Markowitz, Spielman, Sullivan and Fishman (2000), whose African-
American service user sample showed a significantly poorer outcome in response to CBT 
than White and Hispanic service users. For the other treatments, i.e., interpersonal 
psychotherapy (IPT) and supportive psychotherapy with/without imipramine, no difference 
was found in outcomes with respect to ethnicity. Although the implications of such a 
differential response are myriad, there is a lack of well-conducted studies looking into this 
issue. Indeed, Markowitz et al. did not include any description for their interventions, and 
their sample sizes were small, with 14 White patients, eight Hispanic, and only four 
African-American patients receiving CBT. Furthermore, no mention was made either of the 
nature of the CBT delivered or any modifications that were made to treatment based on 
ethnicity. 
Another study that hinted at differences in therapeutic outcome in relation to 
ethnicity is that of Chui, Safer, Bryson, Agras and Wilson (2007), who showed that, while 
there was no difference in rates of abstinence from bingeing and purging in eating 
disordered females of different ethnicities for the secondary outcome measure of reduction 
in binge eating, Black service users responded better to IPT than CBT compared with other 
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ethnic groups (White, Hispanic and Asian). This could be said to reflect Markowitz et al.‟s 
results, showing African American samples to be less responsive to CBT but not less 
responsive to IPT, compared to the other ethnic groups represented in the study. However, 
again there is a problem with sample size, as only eight Black service users were included 
in total over the IPT and CBT groups. The authors argue that these results warrant further 
investigation, with adequate ethnic sample size and power, to look more closely at any 
benefits that IPT may confer in treating Black service users with bulimia nervosa. 
There is also evidence for equivalent treatment outcomes across ethnic groups. 
Miranda et al. (2003) used a CBT intervention that was modified for female, low-income, 
minority service users with depression, but found no difference in response to therapy 
between White, Black and Latina women. Furthermore, Miranda et al. gave details of how 
they tailored their interventions, albeit purely language-based, i.e., the provision of 
bilingual clinical staff, which treated all Spanish-speaking women. Furthermore, all written 
materials were available in Spanish as well as English. All treatment staff, including nurses 
and psychotherapists, were experienced in working with low-income and minority service 
users. However, the authors mentioned no adaptations relating to Black service users‟ 
cultures. Similarly, Zoellner, Feeny, Fitzgibbons and Foa (1999) compared treatment 
outcomes between African American and Caucasian women with post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). They found no difference between these groups in response to CBT for 
PTSD. No details of cultural adaptations were mentioned by these authors. 
The state of the evidence with regard to relative therapy outcomes between ethnic 
minorities is mixed and a consensus is nowhere near being reached. This could be partly 
due to how the research has been conducted. Voss Horrell and Sarah (2008) provided a 
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review of studies that have looked at therapy outcomes in various adult ethnic samples, 
noting that the vast majority of the studies in their review did not compare Black Minority 
and Ethnic (BME) groups with White groups but only compared BME group therapy 
outcomes with treatment-as-usual or with placebo, which does not fully address whether 
contemporary therapies are adequate for BME groups. The authors also noted that there has 
been inadequate reporting in the research of whether any adjustments have been made to 
therapy packages provided to BME groups and their review did not find any studies that 
drew a comparison between culturally-modified therapy and non-modified therapy in terms 
of therapeutic outcomes. Voss Horrell and Sarah recommended that studies should measure 
acculturation in their samples, i.e., the service user‟s “degree of identification with the 
majority culture”.  
Huey and Polo (2008) also raised the issue of acculturation in their review of 
research into evidence-based treatments for ethnic minority youth, in which they pointed 
out that there has traditionally been a poor representation of less acculturated populations in 
such studies. These authors argued that the more acculturated ethnic minority youth could 
be quite similar to the ethnic majority and that, by under-representing the less acculturated 
populations in outcomes research, this research will inevitably overestimate the efficacy of 
standard evidence-based treatments for ethnic minorities.  
Accordingly, some researchers have looked into culturally-tailored therapy. Two 
correlational studies showed an association between ethnic match between client and 
therapist and positive therapeutic outcome (Halliday-Boykins, Schoenwald & Letourneau, 
2005; Yeh, Eastman & Cheung, 1994). The former investigated multisystemic therapy 
(MST), whereas the latter did not report any particular therapeutic modality. However, as 
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correlational studies, neither proves a causal link between ethnic match and better outcome, 
as service users were not randomly assigned to matched therapists.  
Research that has experimentally manipulated culturally-relevant variables has not 
yielded results that are unequivocally in favour of culturally-tailored therapy. Genshaft and 
Hirt (1979) conducted a study into ethnic matching and outcomes, in which African 
American and European American youth were randomly assigned to either a therapist of 
the same race, a therapist of the opposite race, or to a no-treatment control condition. On 
one subtest, training by White models led to better outcomes in cognitive impulsivity for 
youth of both ethnicities than training by either Black models or no treatment. However, on 
another subtest both White and Black children improved similarly and significantly, but 
there was an interaction effect in which this improvement was only evident when the 
therapist‟s race was matched with the child‟s race. 
Szapocznik et al. (1986) compared Structural Family Therapy (SFT) with Bicultural 
Effectiveness Training (BET) as an intervention for Cuban American families with an 
adolescent family member demonstrating “conduct disorder and/or social maladjustment”. 
BET and SFT differed only in that BET added the teaching of “bicultural skills” to families 
(e.g., methods for addressing intercultural conflict between the youth and parents). BET 
was not found to confer additional benefit over SFT. Therefore, much like research into 
differential psychotherapeutic outcomes by ethnicity, the state of the evidence into the 
benefits of culturally-tailored therapy remains equivocal. 
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1.3 Service Evaluation 
The aim of the current study was to explore differences in therapeutic outcomes 
across different ethnic groups. The service that was investigated was the Southwark IAPT 
(Improving Access to Psychological Therapies) service, consisting of four locality clusters: 
North East (NW), North West (NW) South East (SE) and South West (SW). This service is 
otherwise called the Southwark Psychological Therapies Service (SPTS). For convenience, 
the term IAPT will be used throughout. 
Southwark IAPT was an IAPT transition site from 2008 and, in October 2009, 
became an IAPT service. Therapy provided within IAPT follows the “Stepped Care” model 
that is the organising principle underlying many NICE recommendations. Gilbody and 
Bower (2011) describe two of the principles underlying “Stepped Care”: “Least burden”, in 
which the most effective but least economically burdensome treatment is offered to patients 
and “scheduled review”, in which service users are transferred up to higher intensity or 
down to lower intensity treatments if needed. Therefore, IAPT consists of low- and high-
intensity therapy. Low-intensity therapy comprises bibliotherapy and computerised CBT. 
IAPT also runs groups, which are facilitated by both low- and high-intensity clinicians: 
Mental health workshops (sleep/self-confidence/stress), group therapy 
(panic/anxiety/depression) and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy groups. High-intensity 
therapy comprises one-to-one therapy in the form of CBT, IPT or eye movement 
desensitisation and reprogramming (EMDR). Of these three therapies this study only 
considers CBT as the vast majority of service users will be seen for this therapy and, 
therefore, sample sizes for the other two are very low. 
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The relevant outcomes in this study are the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; 
Kroenke, Spitzer and Williams, 2001), which measures depressive symptomatology using a 
nine-question Likert Scale, and the Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-7; 
Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams and Löwe, 2006), which measures anxious symptomatology 
using a seven-question Likert Scale. The PHQ-9 has been shown to be reliable and valid 
(Kroenke et al., 2001) and to have good sensitivity to change (e.g., Löwe, Kroenke, Herzog 
and Gräfe, 2004). The GAD-7 has also been shown to be reliable and valid (Spitzer et al., 
2006). 
The main hypothesis of this study was that the BME service users would show less 
favourable outcomes than White British service users with respect to comparisons in PHQ-
9 (symptoms of depression) and GAD-7 (symptoms of anxiety) scores between first and 
final taking. 
1.4 Method 
1.4.1 Data Collection 
Data was extracted from the IAPTus service user database (an online, password-
protected system for entering and analyzing clinical data). Data for service users in the 
analyses had already been collected as a matter of routine procedure, in which each 
therapist administers a standard weekly IAPT measure that includes the PHQ-9 and the 
GAD-7. Ethnicity data is also collected routinely at each assessment. 
1.4.2 Data Analysis 
Under the “Analysis” tab of IAPTus service user database, the “Activity Analysis” 
report was generated first of all, including all ethnicities. Treatment type to be included in 
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the analysis was selected as “IAPT Treatment”. This analysis included only people who had 
entered “Step 2” (low-intensity therapy) at some point between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10 and 
who had never entered “S3 - CBT” (high intensity therapy) at any point during this time. 
The analysis included only service users who had ended treatment by the time of analysis 
(December, 2010) and this was defined by service users having entered any ending stage at 
any time, such as “Discharged” or “Ended Treatment”. Then service user IDs were 
exported from this report separately for each locality cluster in turn (NE, NW, SE, SW), 
which were then combined, giving the total sample of service users who had entered any 
low-intensity therapy stage at any point between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10 over all of IAPT, 
but who had never entered any high-intensity therapy, and whose treatment had come to an 
end by the time of analysis (December, 2010). 
Step 2 included: 
S2 cCBT (Computerised CBT) 
S2 Group (Group therapy)  
S2 Guided Self Help (Bibliotherapy) 
The “Activity Analysis” report was generated again, including all ethnicities, 
selecting the treatment type to be included in the analysis as “IAPT Treatment”. However, 
this analysis included only people who had entered “S3 - CBT” (High-intensity CBT) at 
any point between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10, whether or not they had ever entered Step 2 (low 
intensity therapy) at any point. Again, the analysis included only service users who had 
ended treatment by the time of analysis (December, 2010). 
Step 3 included: 
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S3 CBT (One-to-one, high-intensity CBT)  
Then service user IDs were exported from this report, separately for each locality 
cluster in turn (NE, NW, SE, SW), which were then combined, giving the total sample of 
service users who had entered any high-intensity therapy stage at any point between 
01.10.09 and 01.10.10, over all of Southwark Psychological Therapies Services, whether or 
not they had ever entered low-intensity therapy, but whose treatment had come to an end by 
the time of analysis (December, 2010). 
Then the separate analyses were pooled together over the four separate locality 
clusters, ending up with all the service user IDs in the NE locality cluster, whether they 
received low-intensity therapy without high-intensity or high-intensity with or without low-
intensity therapy. The same was repeated for the NW, SE, and SW locality clusters. Each 
analysis was looked through for any duplicate IDs, but there were found to be none. The 
entire resulting service user IDs over the NE, NW, SE and SW clusters were then combined 
into one “ID Spreadsheet”.  
Then an “IAPT -> Data Export – Care Pathway” analysis was generated, which 
included all ethnicities and all types of treatment between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10. The 
“Find” function was used within the resulting Excel file to search for IDs found in the “ID 
Spreadhseet” and to extract only those IDs and their corresponding beginning (pre-) and 
end (post-) PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores. The beginning scores were those at each service 
user‟s assessment, prior to being put on the waiting list for treatment, whereas the end 
scores were from the final measures taken from each service user, whether at the end of a 
full course of therapy or at the end of an incomplete course of therapy. The sample thus 
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included dropouts and people who were not seen for a full course of therapy for other 
reasons, as well as treatment completers. 
The “IAPT -> Data Export - Demographics” analysis was generated for all service 
users that had been seen by the service between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10 and the “Find” 
function was used within the resulting Excel file to search for relevant service user IDs 
found in the “ID Spreadsheet” and to extract only those IDs and their corresponding 
“ethnicity category” and gender into a separate Excel spreadsheet. Seven service users had 
opted not to disclose their ethnicity and 25 service users had not stated their ethnicity; their 
data were not included in the study. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of ethnicity and gender of all service users accepted 
for IAPT treatment between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10. The ethnic breakdown of service users 
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Table 1. Ethnicity and gender breakdown of service users accepted for Southwark IAPT 
































Ethnic subgroup Number Male Female Percentage 
White British 202 81 121 77.4194 
 Irish 10 4 6 
 Any Other White 
Background 
148 51 97 
Mixed 
Ethnicity 
White and Black 
Caribbean 
6 2 4 3.4408 
 White and Black 
African 
0 0 0 
 White and Asian 3 0 3 
 Any Other Mixed 
Ethnicity 
7 3 4 
Asian or 
Asian British 
Indian 5 1 4 3.4408 
 Pakistani 3 1 2 
 Bangladeshi 4 0 4 
 Any other Asian 
Background 
4 1 3 
Black or 
Black British 
Caribbean 22 2 20 10.9677 
 African 20 5 15 
 Any Other Black 
Background 
9 5 4 
Other Ethnic 
Groups 
Chinese 7 3 4 4.7312 
 Any Other Ethnic 
Group 
15 4 11 
Grand Total: 465 163 302 100 



























Figure 1. Pie chart of ethnicities of service users accepted by Southwark IAPT between 






Due to a lack of previous studies reporting effect sizes for differences in therapy 
outcomes between ethnic groups, a power analysis co  uld not be calculated. A sample size 
of 30 was deemed a reasonable cut-off for inclusion in the analyses. Only three groups met 
this cut-off: White British (n = 202), Any Other White Background (n = 148) and Black or 
Black British (n = 51; this sample size was achieved by collapsing the categories of 
Caribbean, African and Any Other Black Background.) 
A small proportion of those in therapy between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10 did not have 
the requisite post-PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores in order to include them in the analysis and 
some did not have the pre-PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores either. An “IAPT Data Export 
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Clinical Contacts” analysis showed that most of these service users had only attended one 
therapy session, and had therefore only completed the pre- PHQ-9 and GAD-7. Two had 
not attended their scheduled session and, for one service user, there was no record in the 
Data Export file of any session having been arranged. Therefore, these service users were 
excluded from the analysis. Fifteen people were excluded from the White British group on 
this basis, leaving a total of 187 White British service users in the final analysis (8.02% of 
White British service users were excluded due to data incompleteness); 2 people were 
excluded from the Any Other White Background group on this basis, leaving a total of 146 
White service users in the final analysis (1.37% of Any Other White Background service 
users were excluded due to data incompleteness); 4 people were excluded from the Black or 
Black British group on this basis, leaving a total of 47 Black or Black British service users 
in the final analysis (7.84% of Black or Black British service users were excluded due to 
data incompleteness.); one person had not stated their ethnicity. 
For these 22 excluded subjects, only 18 had a pre-PHQ-9 and pre-GAD-7 score, the 
means of which were calculated as 11.39 (SD = 8.16) and 10.06 (SD = 7.30), respectively. 
Although no formal analysis was conducted to compare these scores with those of the main 
sample due to 18 being a low sample size, the means for these 18 service users‟ scores do 
not appear significantly discrepant from those of the main sample (see Results section), 
indicating that their exclusion from the data would not have led to an overestimation of 
treatment success due to drop out bias. 
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1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample to be analysed consisted of the following groups: White British (n 
= 187), Any Other White Background (n = 146) and Black or Black British (n = 47). Table 
2 shows the descriptive statistics of these groups‟ outcome measures as a whole. 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation of outcome measures at first and final taking. 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
PHQ-9 first 12.7053 6.71724 
PHQ-9 last 7.3158 6.32958 
GAD-7 first 10.7395 5.77210 
GAD-7 last 6.5132 5.66965 
 
1.5.2 Main Analyses 
Two one-way ANOVAs were performed on the data from these 3 groups, one to 
look at ethnicity group differences in change in PHQ-9 score and the other to look at 
ethnicity group differences in change in GAD-7 score. Skewness and kurtosis values for 
change in PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores were all within the range of -2 to +2, which was 
accepted as near enough normally distributed for an ANOVA to be meaningful. 
The ANOVAs indicated that the change in PHQ-9 scores and GAD-7 scores was 
not significantly different at the 5% level between the three ethnicity groups (PHQ-9: F(2, 
377) = 1.004, p = .367; GAD-7: F(2, 377) = .590, p = .555) 
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In order to assess whether there had been a therapeutic change in service users‟ 
depression and anxiety as a result of intervention, regardless of ethnicity, two-tailed paired-
samples t-tests were carried out to compare first and last PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores. 
Skewness and kurtosis values of PHQ-9 first and last and GAD-7 first and last scores were 
all within the range of -2 to +2, which was accepted as near enough normally distributed for 
a t-test to be meaningful. Both t-tests indicated that scores changed significantly at the 5% 
level between the first and last taking (PHQ-9: t(379) = 15.976, p < .001; GAD-7: t(379) = 
13.548, p < .001). Descriptive statistics of changes in questionnaire scores are shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of changes in outcome measures between first and 
final taking. 
Comparison Mean  Standard Deviation 
PHQ first – PHQ 
last 
5.3895 6.5762 




1.5.3 Subsidiary Analyses 
1.5.3.1 Caseness. 
The proportion of service users who presented at caseness at the beginning of 
therapy (PHQ ≥ 10 or GAD ≥ 8) across the different ethnic groups is shown in Table 4: 
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Table 4. Caseness on assessment across the three ethnic groups. 
Ethnicity Number reaching 
caseness on initial 
assessment 
% reaching caseness on 
initial assessment 
White British 134 71.66 
Any Other White 
Background 
113 77.40 
Black or Black British 38 80.90 
 
Given that a sizeable minority from each group did not present at caseness at the 
beginning, it was reasoned that this could obscure an effect of ethnicity on therapy 
outcomes, as those who were below caseness at the beginning may not have derived their 
maximal benefit from therapy. This was especially important as Table 4 indicates a possible 
discrepancy in percentage reaching caseness on assessment between the three groups. 
In order to address this, a separate Excel spreadsheet was created which excluded 
data from service users who were below caseness, i.e., whose PHQ-9 score was nine or 
below and whose GAD-7 score was seven or below. Two one-way ANOVAs were 
performed to compare the change in PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores between the three ethnicity 
groups. Skewness and kurtosis values for change in PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores for only 
those service users reaching caseness on assessment were all within the range of -2 to +2, 
which was accepted as near enough normally distributed for an ANOVA to be meaningful. 
The ANOVAs indicated that the change in PHQ-9 scores and GAD-7 scores was 
not significantly different at the 5% level between the three ethnicity groups (PHQ-9: F(2, 
284) = .649, p = .523; GAD-7: F(2, 284) = .205, p = .815). 
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1.5.3.2 Representativeness. 
The question of the representativeness of IAPT service users, although not the focus 
of this service evaluation, was nonetheless deemed important to consider. Research has 
shown, for example, that Black service users are over-represented in high secure settings, 
e.g., Kaye and Lingiah (2000), whereas their treatment at an earlier period in the 
development of their mental illness is limited partly by a lower likelihood of consulting 
GPs regarding mental health problems (e.g., Bhugra et al., 1997) as well as a reduced 
ability of GPs to recognise psychiatric disorder in Black patients (e.g., Commander, 
Dharan, Odell & Surtees, 1997). Brown, Schulberg and Madonia (1996) showed their 
African American sample with depression to have significantly more predominant somatic 
symptoms and also to report significantly higher physical disability than the White 
American sample, arguing that GPs‟ difficulties with detecting depression in the former 
might partly be based on culturally-specific ways in which depression manifests. 
Appendix 1 shows the relative proportions of different ethnic minorities in 
Southwark primary care psychological therapy services (i.e., the precursor to Southwark 
IAPT) over four years (2004-2008; Data collated by Dr Jane Hutton). This can be 
compared with Table 1, which shows the proportions of services users from different ethnic 
groups accepted by Southwark primary care psychological therapy services (which had 
become Southwark IAPT) between 01.10.09 and 01.10.10. Visual comparison of Appendix 
1 and Table 1 does not indicate any obvious differences in the proportions of different 
ethnicities represented in primary care before and after Southwark primary care 
psychological therapy services became IAPT. 
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSES TO TREATMENT BY ETHNICITY 153 
 
Due to the broader categories in Appendix 1 (collapsing White British, White Irish 
and Any Other White Background under the category “White”, for example), only one 
analysis was carried out to explore the broad change in the proportion of White and non-
White service users accepted by Southwark primary care psychological therapy services 
since 2008. A non-parametric binomial test indicated that the percentage of White service 
users (including British, Irish and Any Other White Background) seen for therapy in the 
period sampled by this study (77.4%) had not changed significantly at the 5% probability 
level since 2008 (74.2%), although this was approaching significance (p = 0.61), and 
therefore that the percentage of non-White service users considered as a whole had not 
changed (25.8% in 2008 compared with 22.6% in the current study). 
According to the 2001 Census, 52.3% of people in the London Borough of 
Southwark identified their ethnicity as White British (source: Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) estimated resident population by ethnic group). This ethnic breakdown is displayed 
in Figure 2. Appendix 2 shows a table of numbers and proportions of ethnic groups in 
Southwark according to the 2001 Census. It should be noted that the population of 
Southwark has changed considerably since 2001, i.e., with a reduction in the number of 
Black people and an increase in White non-British people (ONS estimated resident 
population by ethnic group). The ONS provides estimates of “experimental” estimates of 
the current ethnic proportions in Southwark, based on extrapolation of figures since the 
2001 Census. 
Various non-parametric binomial tests were conducted to compare the proportions 
of different ethnicities accepted by IAPT over the period sampled in this study with those in 
the population of Southwark in 2001, according to the Census. 
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1. The percentage of White British people accepted by Southwark IAPT over the 
period sampled in this study (43.44%) was significantly lower at the 5% probability level 
than the percentage of people from a White British background in the Southwark 
population in 2001 (p < 0.01). 
2. The percentage of people of Any Other White Background accepted by 
Southwark IAPT over the period sampled in this study (31.83%) was significantly higher at 
the 5% probability level than the percentage of people from Any Other White Background 
in the Southwark population in 2001 (p < 0.01). 
3. The percentage of people from a White Irish background accepted by IAPT over 
the period sampled in this study (2.15%) was not significantly different at the 5% 
probability level than the percentage of people from a White Irish background in the 
Southwark population in 2001 (p = .146). 
4. The percentage of people of Mixed Ethnicity (White and Black Caribbean; White 
and Black African; White and Asian; Any other Mixed Ethnicity) accepted by Southwark 
IAPT over the period sampled in this study (3.44%) was not significantly different at the 
5% probability level than the percentage of people of Mixed Ethnicity in the Southwark 
population in 2001 (p = .446). 
5. The percentage of people of Mixed Ethnicity (White and Black Caribbean; White 
and Black African; White and Asian; Any other Mixed Ethnicity) accepted by Southwark 
IAPT over the period sampled in this study (3.44%) was not significantly different at the 
5% probability level than the percentage of people of Mixed Ethnicity in the Southwark 
population in 2001 (p = .446). 























Any  Other 
Mixed Ethnicity 1%8%
6. The percentage of Black people (Carribean; African; Any Other Black 
Background) accepted by Southwark IAPT over the period sampled in this study (10.97%) 
was significantly lower at the 5% probability level than the percentage of Black people in 
the Southwark population in 2001 (p < .01).  








The principal finding from this study was that of no significant difference in therapy 
outcomes between service users who are Black and Black British, White British and of Any 
Other White Background, with respect to changes in depressive and anxious 
symptomatology in response to IAPT treatment. This non-significance held even when 
those service users who were not at caseness on assessment were excluded from the 
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analysis. Therefore, the main hypothesis of the study, of less favourable outcomes in BME 
service users than in White British service users, is not supported. 
Perhaps the most immediately apparent explanation for this is that, in Southwark 
IAPT, therapy is equally efficacious for use with Black and Black British as well as Any 
Other White BME groups as it is for use with White British groups. What might Southwark 
IAPT be doing right in its provision of therapy to these BME groups? 
IAPT has made efforts to improve the acceptability of therapy to BME groups. First 
of all, training on working with cultural/ethnic diversity is covered as part of IAPT courses, 
which might better equip IAPT high- and low-intensity trainees to adapt their approach to 
individual clients‟ needs. Furthermore, the provision of group workshops for patients forms 
a large part of low-intensity therapy, which may be perceived as less hierarchical than the 
one-to-one therapeutic dyad, potentially improving acceptability to BME groups. A group 
setup might furthermore allow for a better treatment of certain issues of which many IAPT 
therapists, who are predominantly White British, could have little theoretical or experiential 
understanding, such as the societal and institutional prejudice that can be experienced by 
BME groups. These workshops are often held in areas of high BME rates (such as Peckham 
Pulse, a Gym in the middle of Peckham) again adding to their perceived acceptability to 
BME groups. 
When constructing its Information Leaflet for service users, Southwark IAPT 
liaised with Cares of Life (a Maudsley-funded organisation, which aims to improve 
accessibility to BME groups, especially the Black population), who had a lot of input into 
the design of the Leaflet and helped with making it more welcoming to BME groups. 
Moreover, Southwark IAPT publicises in pubs, libraries, GP surgeries, churches and 
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community centres. Some of these advertising locales may be particularly good for 
improving access to BME groups, as they are separate from the medical context and enter, 
for example, a spiritual/religious context. This is particularly important for improving 
access to those for whom mental illness is more meaningfully conceptualised as a 
spiritual/religious crisis. 
Although the principal finding of this research is encouraging, it should be 
interpreted with caution, as there are some notable limitations to this study. Firstly, White 
British service users were not all placed in the same ethnic category. This is because, under 
the heading of “Other White Background” are included six subcategories that are within 
Britain (English, Scottish, Welsh, Cornish, Northern Irish and Ulster Scots), in addition to 
various ethnicities outside Britain (such as Greek Cypriot, Polish and Croatian). Therefore, 
an English person could have self-categorised as either White British within the White 
category or as English within the Any Other White Background category. It is likely that 
this overlap of ethnic categories contaminated the comparison of White British and Any 
Other White Background in this study. 
A second limitation is that very few of the people seen in IAPT are likely to be low-
acculturated: they may tick a box describing themselves as African, for instance, but have a 
very fluent level of English and a typically Westernised perspective of mental illness and of 
the effectiveness and appropriateness of IAPT-delivered psychological interventions. This 
is a problem common to previous research. As discussed previously, research into treatment 
outcomes has traditionally under-represented less acculturated ethnic minorities, and has 
likely overestimated the efficacy of Western treatments for ethnic minorities. With no 
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indication of degree of acculturation, this study might have been blind to any differences in 
treatment effectiveness across ethnicities. 
The main reason that the data are blind to levels of acculturation is that service 
users‟ ethnic self-categorisation will inevitably be subjective and open to bias from a range 
of sources, such as fear of prejudice and desire for (non)conformity with the prevailing 
culture. IAPT might need to start collecting data on more meaningful markers of ethnicity 
that indicate degree of acculturation and are not as open to such biases. This will allow 
future clinicians/researchers to draw the most meaningful group comparisons, addressing 
the hypothesis of the current study to a more satisfactory level. 
One approximation of degree of acculturation might be the number of years 
someone has spent in the host country, increasing their chances of taking on its values, 
cultural beliefs and cultural practices. Although IAPT already collects data on preferred 
language, asking people about the language spoken at home could fine-tune the 
measurement of degree of acculturation. Finally, a more subjective measure of 
acculturation could be useful, such as an adaptation of “The Inclusion of Other in the Self 
(IOS) Scale” (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992). Service users could be asked to select one pair 
of overlapping circles from an array that best describes their degree of identification with 
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Figure 3. A means of categorising one‟s degree of acculturation with British culture, 
adapted from the Inclusion of Others in the Self (IOS) Scale (Aron et al., 1992). 
 
This study demonstrates an underrepresentation of Black and Black British groups 
in Southwark IAPT. This underrepresentation will undoubtedly be far worse for the least 
acculturated BME groups, for whom it could be argued CBT in its non-adapted form is 
least likely to be effective, for the reasons outlined in the introduction. Therefore, there is a 
need to increase the representation of Black and Black British service users in Southwark 
IAPT. Future service studies of ethnic differences in treatment outcomes should go hand in 
hand with increased drives to recruit ethnic minorities into psychological therapy.  
Webster (2002), in this document entitled “Improving Psychology Services to 
Diverse Communities” (on the South London & Maudsley NHS Trust Intranet), gives a 
detailed list of possible avenues to explore when trying to improve accessibility and 
acceptability of psychology services to BME groups. One idea that Webster mentions, 
which could be applicable to Southwark IAPT, is to set up culturally specific therapy 
groups. This might be particularly helpful for those who are experiencing a difficult 
transition to British life and culture and, and in order to provide a forum in which to share 
common culture-bound experiences or, as mentioned previously, in which to discuss with 
others in a similar situation the prejudice that can be directed toward BME groups. 
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Webster (2002) argues that involving BME organisations, such as faith leaders and 
those in the voluntary sector, is a key strategy in improving acceptability and accessibility 
of psychological therapies for BME groups. However, he makes the caveat that such 
organisations can feel “overconsulted”, in which their views are often sought but rarely 
translate into changes to services. Committing to acting on views is important, therefore, 
and it is recommended in Webster‟s document that consultees should at least be asked to 
look over the write-up of consultation meetings before this is disseminated, in order to 
ensure that their views are accurately represented. Another important suggestion in this 
document is that of allocating therapy supervision time to a discussion of any ethnic 
differences between service user and therapist. This would likely require further training for 
IAPT supervisors. 
Although it can be very helpful to enter into discussions with the service user about 
their ethnic backgrounds in order to develop rapport and to build a formulation of their 
difficulties, it could be that a deeper understanding of a service user‟s culture would be 
arrived at from another of Webster‟s suggestions, i.e., visiting service users at home. This 
would allow for a more direct experience of the service user‟s cultural context and how this 
may inform psychological formulation and intervention. 
The current study indicated an underrepresentation of White British service users 
and an overrepresentation of service users of Any Other White Background, relative to the 
population of Southwark in 2001; however, this is likely to be an artefact of how ethnicity 
data is collected in IAPT, as the overlap in ethnic category discussed previously could have 
resulted in people of very similar ethnicities being placed in different ethnic groups. It is 
also possible that there has been, for some reason, an increase in the number of service 
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users of non-British White backgrounds seen by IAPT. The fact that the IAPTus analysis 
does not provide a breakdown of ethnic subgroups means that this could not be further 
explored in the current study. 
In terms of other limitations to this study, in order to ensure sufficient sample sizes, 
some ethnic groups were collapsed to produce a larger group. Although a longer time 
period could be sampled in order to increase the sample size of each ethnic group, this 
could obscure the effects of more recent service changes. Finally, had time permitted, 
differential drop-out rates of different ethnic groups would have been an interesting 
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Appendix 1 
Proportions of Different Ethnic Minorities in Southwark Primary Care Psychological 
Therapy Services over Four Years 
Primary Care 2005 N [%] 2006 N [%] 2007 N [%] 2008 N [%] 
White 200 [71.4] 370 [70.6] 240 [80.5] 439 [74.2] 
Black African 23 [8.2] 15 [2.9] 4 [1.3] 25 [4.2] 
Black Caribbean 17 [6.1] 46 [8.8] 16 [5.4] 21 [3.5] 
Black Other 15 [5.4] 40 [7.6] 15 [5.0] 38 [6.4] 
Indian 2 [0.7] 5 [1.0] 7 [2.3] 5 [0.8] 
Pakistani 1 [0.4] 8 [1.5] 1 [0.3] 3 [0.5] 
Bangladeshi 1 [0.4] 2 [0.4] 4 [1.3] 9 [1.5] 
Chinese 4 [1.4] 5 [1.0] 1 [0.3] 14 [2.4] 
Other Asian 3 [1.1] 0 [0] 4 [1.3] 3 [0.5] 
Other 14 [5.0] 33 [6.3] 7 [2.3] 35 [5.9] 
Total 280 524 298 592 
Note: Data collated by Dr Jane Hutton. 
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Appendix 2 
Population of Southwark by Ethnic Group According to the 2001 Census. 
Ethnic Group  N  %  
White British  134,200 52.3 
White Irish  8,000  3.1  
Other White  20,100  7.8  
White and Black  
Caribbean  
3,500  1.4 
  
White and Black  
African  
2,000  0.8  
White and Asian  1,400  0.5  
Other Mixed  2,600  1.0  
Indian  3,900  1.5  
Pakistani  1,200  0.5  
Bangladeshi  3,800  1.5  
Other Asian  1,600  0.6  
Black Caribbean  20,300  7.9  
Black African  40,800  15.9  
Other Black  4,700  1.8  
Chinese  4,800  1.9  
Other Ethnic Group  3,700 1.4 
Southwark  256,700  100.0 
 
 
